Clash of Cultures: Epistemic Communities, Negotiation Theory, and International Lawmaking by Strong, S. I.
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals
August 2017
Clash of Cultures: Epistemic Communities,
Negotiation Theory, and International Lawmaking
S. I. Strong
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Strong, S. I. (2017) "Clash of Cultures: Epistemic Communities, Negotiation Theory, and International
Lawmaking," Akron Law Review: Vol. 50 : Iss. 3 , Article 4.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol50/iss3/4
495 
CLASH OF CULTURES: EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES,
NEGOTIATION THEORY, AND INTERNATIONAL
LAWMAKING 
S.I. Strong*
I. Introduction ....................................................................... 495 
II. Epistemic Communities and International Relations
Theory ................................................................................ 499 
III. Epistemic Communities and the UNCITRAL Process...... 506 
A. Epistemic Communities in International
Lawmaking Processes ................................................. 506 
B. Epistemic Communities and Negotiation Theory ....... 514 
IV. Epistemic Communities, Negotiation Theory and the
UNCITRAL Process .......................................................... 517 
A. Core Values and Interests of the International
Commercial Arbitration Community .......................... 520 
B. Core Values and Interests of the (International
Commercial) Mediation Community .......................... 524 
V. Conclusion ......................................................................... 530
I. INTRODUCTION
In July 2014, the United States Government submitted a proposal to 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL)1 suggesting the creation of a new international treaty 
* D.Phil., University of Oxford (U.K.); Ph.D. (law), University of Cambridge (U.K.); J.D., Duke
University; M.P.W., University of Southern California; B.A., University of California, Davis. The
author, who is admitted to practice as an attorney in New York, Illinois and Missouri and as a
solicitor in England and Wales, is the Manley O. Hudson Professor of Law at the University of
Missouri and Senior Fellow at the Center for the Study of Dispute Resolution. The author would
like to thank Perry Bechky and Tim Schnabel for comments and insights on earlier drafts of this
Article. Although the author has been involved in discussions at both the national and international
levels regarding a possible new international convention on international commercial mediation and
conciliation, the opinions expressed in this Article are those of the author alone and do not reflect
the views of any governmental or non-governmental body.
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concerning the enforcement of settlement agreements arising out of 
international commercial mediation and conciliation.2 The Commission 
sent the proposal to UNCITRAL Working Group II (Arbitration and 
Conciliation) for further consideration, and the initiative moved 
forward.3 At the time this Article was published, the instrument was in 
the drafting stages, although the final form of the document (convention, 
model law, or advisory statement) was still under discussion.4 
As important as the U.S. proposal has been to the substantive 
debate about the need for and shape of a future instrument in this field,5 
1. See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Proposal by the
Government of the United States of America: Future Work for Working Group II, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/822 (June 2, 2014) [hereinafter U.S. Proposal]. The State Department’s interest in this 
subject arose as a result of this author’s academic work in this field. See S.I. Strong, Beyond 
International Commercial Arbitration? The Promise of International Commercial Mediation, 45 
WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 11, 29-38 (2014) [hereinafter Strong, ICM]; see also infra note 62.  
2. Although the scholarly community debates the precise meaning of the terms “mediation” 
and “conciliation,” this Article will consider the two to be synonymous for the purpose of this 
discussion, an approach that is consistent with that taken by UNCITRAL. See United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and 
Conciliation) on the work of its sixty-second session (New York, 2-6 February 2015), para. 13 n.11, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/832 (Feb. 11, 2015) [hereinafter WG Report]; UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Conciliation with Guide to Enactment and Use 2002 [hereinafter 
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW GUIDE].  
3. See Annotated Provisional Agenda, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.139, paras. 12-19 
(Nov. 4, 2015) [hereinafter February 2016 Agenda]; see also United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law, Annotated Provisional Agenda, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.185 (Nov. 
4, 2014); Note by UNCITRAL Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Enforceability of 
Settlement Agreements Resulting From International Commercial Conciliation/Mediation, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.187 (Nov. 27, 2014) [hereinafter Secretariat Note]; Comments Received 
From States, Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Enforceability of Settlement Agreements 
Resulting From International Commercial Conciliation/Mediation—Revision of UNCITRAL Notes 
on Organizing Arbitral Proceedings, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WP.II/WP.188 (Dec. 23, 2014) [hereinafter 
Initial States’ Comments].  
3. See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on its forty-
seventh Session (7-18 July 2014), U.N. G.A.O.R. 69th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 24, U.N. Doc. 
A/69/17. 
4. At the time of publication, the most recent in-depth discussion of the U.S. proposal took
place at the February 2017 meeting of Working Group II. See United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law, Report of Working Group II (Dispute Settlement) on the work of its sixty-
sixth session (New York, 6-10 February 2017), U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/901 (Feb. 16, 2017).  The 
session was extremely productive and delegates came to agreement on a number of important 
points. See id. The project was also favorably discussed at the forty-ninth session of the 
Commission in June and July 2016. See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 
Annotated Provisional Agenda, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.197 (July 14, 2016); United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law, Note by UNCITRAL Secretariat, International 
Commercial Conciliation: Preparation of an Instrument on Enforcement of International 
Commercial Settlement Agreements Resulting From Conciliation, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.198 (June 30, 2016) [hereinafter Secretariat 2016 Note]. 
5. See Laurence Boule, International Enforceability for Mediated Settlement Agreements:
2
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the UNCITRAL deliberations have also uncovered a number of process-
oriented issues that raise doubts about certain long-held assumptions 
regarding the nature of the international legal community and the 
contemporary approach to the negotiation of international treaties. As a 
result, the current discussions about the proposed treaty provide a unique 
opportunity to consider how various theories regarding international 
relations actually affect the international lawmaking process. 
This Article seeks to illuminate a number of truths about the current 
deliberations at UNCITRAL by applying the concept of epistemic 
communities to the UNCITRAL negotiation process. This analysis will 
help various participants, including state delegates, inter-governmental 
organizations (IGOs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
appreciate the dynamics at issue in the treaty deliberations and thereby 
improve negotiation techniques and outcomes.6 In particular, this Article 
considers how disparities between different epistemic communities 
involved in the UNCITRAL process could affect the shape and future of 
the proposed convention and whether the clash of cultures could prove 
Developing the Conceptual Framework, 7 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 35, 65 (2014) (proposing a 
convention); CPR Institute, Research Preview Provides Rare Mediation User Data in the 
International Arena, 33 ALT. HIGH COST LITIG. 92 (2015) (discussing empirical data supporting a 
new convention in this field); Ellen A. Deason, Enforcement of Settlement Agreements in 
International Commercial Mediation: A New Legal Framework?, 22 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 32 (2015) 
(discussing the current U.S. initiative); Laura A. Kaster, Will There Be A Vast Worldwide Expansion 
of Mediation for International Disputes?, 33 ALT. HIGH COST LITIG. 120 (2015) (describing the 
current debate at UNCITRAL); Yaraslau Kryvoi & Dmitry Davyenko, Consent Awards in 
International Arbitration: From Settlement to Enforcement, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 827 (2015) 
(discussing the UNCITRAL deliberations); Audrey Hong Li, Thought on Developing Convention on 
Enforceability of Settlement Agreements Reached Through Conciliation, ASIA PACIFIC REGIONAL 
ARBITRATION GROUP (APRAG) NEWSLETTER, 19, 20 (July-Dec. 2014) (supporting a new 
convention); Chang-Fa Lo, Desirability of a New International Legal Framework for Cross-Border 
Enforcement of Certain Mediated Settlement Agreements, 7 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. 119, 135 (2014) 
(suggesting a new enforcement regime); Ray D. Madoff, Lurking in the Shadow: The Unseen Hand 
of Doctrine in Dispute Resolution, 76 SO. CAL. L. REV. 161, 161-66 (2002) (noting the need for a 
new treaty); Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 11 (proposing a new convention); Bobette Wolski, 
Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements (MSAs): Critical Questions and Directions for Future 
Research, 7 CONTEMP. ASIA ARB. J. 87, 110 (2014) (supporting a new treaty).  
6. This type of analysis has been undertaken in the past, initially with respect to
international environmental law. See, e.g., Oran R. Young, Rights, Rules, and Resources in World 
Affairs, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: DRAWING INSIGHTS FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL EXPERIENCE 1, 
10 (Oran R. Young ed., 1997); Jutta Brunee & Stephen J. Toope, Environmental Security and 
Freshwater Resources: Ecosystem Regime Building, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 26, 31 (1997). However, the 
concept of epistemic communities has also been successfully used in the context of international 
trade law and international arbitration. See Stephan W. Schill, W(h)ither Regulation? On the 
Literature and Sociology of International Investment Law, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 875, 888 (2011) 
(distinguishing between epistemic communities in “private commercial law and arbitration” and 
public international law); Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and 
International Investment Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 71 (2014).  
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fatal to the development of a new international instrument in this area of 
law. 
Although the current discussion is set within a particular context, 
the research findings are widely transferable to other settings and apply 
to international lawmaking on subjects other than dispute resolution and 
in settings other than UNCITRAL. This type of intellectual cross-
fertilization is extremely helpful and moves in both directions. For 
example, the process of “transgovernmental coalition building” has been 
successfully studied in a variety of settings but has not yet been 
discussed in the context of international dispute resolution.7 Thus, this 
strand of international relations theory seems ripe for transference to the 
world of international dispute resolution.8 
As a methodological matter, the current analysis adopts a 
negotiation-analytic perspective rather than a game-theoretic approach.9 
To some extent, this choice may appear unusual, given the extensive use 
of game theory in international law and international relations.10 
However, a number of commentators have argued that negotiation 
theory is more accurate than game theory in describing and anticipating 
the forces at work in the international lawmaking process.11 This 
conclusion is based on the fact that negotiation theorists “typically 
assume intelligent, goal-seeking action by the other players but not full 
strategic rationality,” as is the case with game theorists.12 Thus, 
7. Sungjoon Cho & Claire R. Kelly, Promises and Perils of New Global Governance: A
Case of the G20, 12 CHI. J. INT’L. 491, 502 (2012) (quoting Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, 
Transgovernmental Relations and International Organizations, 27 WORLD POL. 39, 44 (1974)). 
8. This type of analysis has seldom been conducted. See Andrea Bianchi, Epistemic 
Communities, in FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW *1, 1 (Jean d’Aspremont & 
Sahib Singh eds., forthcoming 2017) (noting that law accounts for only six percent of the references 
to the concept of ‘epistemic communities’ by discipline in a citation analysis reflected in Peter 
Haas, Epistemic Communities, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE POLITICS 351, 357 
(Joel Krieger ed., 2013)). Notably, this methodology differs from standard cross-cultural analyses, 
which focus on national differences. See, e.g., Erin Meyer, Getting to Si, Ja, Oui, Hai and Da, 
HARV. BUS. REV. 74, 74-80 (2015).  
9. See James K. Sebenius, Challenging Conventional Explanations of International
Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities, 46 INT’L ORG. 323, 
351 (1992).  
10. See id. 
11. See Antonia Chayes, International Agreements: Why They Count as Law, 103 AM. SOC’Y 
INT’L PROC. 158, 160 (2009) (noting negotiation theory adds another level of complexity to game 
theory in the context of international treaty negotiation); Sebenius, supra note 9, at 325, 351; see 
also Christian Downie, Managing Complexity in International Negotiations: Is There A Role for 
Treaty Secretariats?, 2-6, http://www.guillaumenicaise.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/
DOWNIE_Managing-Complexity-in-International-Negotiations.pdf [hereinafter Downie, 
Complexity] (discussing the relationship between game theory and negotiation theory). 
12. Sebenius, supra note 9, at 350. Game theory “assume[s] that players are fully rational and 
4
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negotiation theory incorporates various elements of game theory but 
takes the analysis to a higher level of complexity.13 
The Article proceeds as follows. First, Section II introduces the 
concept of epistemic communities as developed by international 
relations theorists and considers those principles in light of the current 
UNCITRAL process. Next, Section III analyzes the role of epistemic 
communities in the international lawmaking process and discusses how 
those groups operate pursuant to standard principles of negotiation 
theory. Section IV then applies both sets of the theories to the ongoing 
deliberations at UNCITRAL to identify the interests and goals of the 
different epistemic communities and determine whether and to what 
extent various areas of divergence and convergence will affect the 
UNCITRAL deliberation process. Section V concludes the Article by 
tying together various strands of analysis and identifying several 
tangible proposals for negotiators at UNCITRAL. 
This discussion is set in the context of the current debate about a 
new treaty on mediated settlement agreements and is therefore most 
relevant to those involved in that process. However, the Article has 
much broader ramifications. Not only does the analysis provide 
important new insights into the theoretical nature of the international 
legal community, it also offers new ideas about how certain practical 
problems involving international dispute resolution can and perhaps 
should be resolved.14 As a result, the research findings reflected herein 
are relevant to anyone working in the area of international lawmaking. 
II. EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
THEORY 
International relations theory defines an epistemic community as a 
“network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in 
a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue-area.”15 These groups reflect 
analyze their actions by equilibrium methods that calculate what each should optimally do given the 
others’ optimal choice.” Id.  
13. See Chayes, supra note 11, at 160; Downie, Complexity, supra note 11, at 2-6. 
14. Many of the criticisms have focused on the increasing cost and legalism of international
commercial arbitration. See David Rivkin, A New Contract Between Arbitrators and Parties (Oct. 
27, 2015),  http://sccinstitute.com/media/93206/1000973790v2-hkiac-keynote-address.pdf 
(constituting a speech from the president of the International Bar Association proposing a new 
means to reduce costs in international arbitration); Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 11. 
15. Peter M. Haas, Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L 
ORG. 1, 2-3 (1992) (citations omitted).  
5
Strong: Clash of Cultures
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017
500 AKRON LAW REVIEW [50:495 
(1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a
value-based rationale for the social action of community members; (2)
shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices
leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and
which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages be-
tween possible policy actions and desired outcomes; (3) shared notions
of validity—that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for
weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise;
and (4) a common policy enterprise—that is, a set of common practic-
es associated with a set of problems to which their professional compe-
tence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare
will be enhanced as a consequence.16
At one time, theorists used this definition to conclude that 
international lawyers, judges, and commentators comprised a single 
epistemic community.17 However, the expansion and diversification of 
international law has led to various schisms within the group. As a 
result, experts in international trade law are now considered to be 
separate from experts in international investment law, while specialists 
in international dispute resolution are seen as distinguishable from 
specialists in public international law.18 
The question now arises as to whether the field of international 
dispute resolution can or should be defined as consisting of two separate 
and distinct groups, one involving specialists in international arbitration 
and the other involving experts in mediation. This proposition is based 
on the ongoing deliberations at UNCITRAL concerning the proposed 
treaty on mediated settlements, which has seen some participants 
16. Id. (citation omitted). Epistemic communities may also have 
share[d] intersubjective understandings; have a shared way of knowing; have shared
patterns of reasoning; have a policy project drawing on shared values, shared causal
beliefs, and the use of shared discursive practices; and have a shared commitment to the
application and production of knowledge.
Id. at 3 n.5. 
17. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW GLOBAL ORDER 65-100 (2004); Charlotte Ku,
The ASIL as an Epistemic Community, 90 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 224, 584 (1996); Andy Olson, 
An Empire of Scholars: Transnational Lawyers and the Rule of Opinio Juris, 29 PERSPECTIVES 
POL. SCI. 23 (2000) (suggesting that specialists in international law constitute a closed epistemic 
community); Ruti Teitel & Robert Howse, Cross-Judging: Tribunalization in a Fragmented But 
Interconnected Global Order, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 959, 966 (2009) (stating “that 
international lawyers and judges constitute an epistemic community” and that “[s]uch an epistemic 
community or network is capable of overcoming or mitigating many axes or dimensions of 
fragmentation”).  
18. See Schill, supra note 6, at 888; Robert D. Sloane, Law at the Vanishing Point: A
Philosophical Analysis of International Law, by Aaron Fichtelberg, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 549, 554 
(2010) (book review); Wagner, supra note 6, at 71. 
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focusing on different issues, concerns, and strategies, depending on 
whether and to what extent those persons come from an arbitration or 
mediation background.19 If such a division does exist, it could affect the 
negotiation strategies and outcomes at UNCITRAL.20 
The process of identifying an epistemic community can be 
somewhat difficult, since there is no need for members of a particular 
community to hold a certain set of credentials or be recognized by an 
official regulatory body.21 Instead, epistemic communities are made up 
of individuals “who have a sufficiently strong claim to a body of 
knowledge that is valued by society.”22 Groups can develop around 
shared technical expertise in the hard or social sciences and around 
common beliefs about various processes or analytic methods used in the 
members’ professions or disciplines.23 
Some epistemic communities are limited to the national sphere, 
although groups can take on a transnational tenor as shared ideas spread 
19. The author has been part of discussions at both the national and international levels
regarding the proposed convention since the idea was first presented to the U.S. State Department in 
February 2014. Since some of those discussions took place on an unattributed basis (i.e., pursuant to 
the Chatham House Rule), this Article will not identify specific positions taken by any individuals 
or groups beyond what is noted in documents that have been made publicly available by 
UNCITRAL and UNCITRAL Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation). 
20. See infra notes 106-87 and accompanying text.
21. At this point, neither mediation nor arbitration are officially regulated, although there are
various initiatives associated with self-regulation and credentialing. See, e.g., Robert A. Creo, 
Mediation 2004: The Art and the Artist, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1017, 1021 (2004) (calling for 
credentialing in mediation); Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of the International Arbitrator, 20 
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 957, 968 (2005) (noting “prior service as an arbitrator is the preeminent 
qualification for an arbitrator-candidate”); Thomas J. Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare, Living With 
ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration, and Conflict Management in 
Fortune 1000 Corporations, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 11 n.58 (2014) (noting attempts to 
credential arbitrators); How to Become IMI Certified, INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION INSTITUTE, 
https://imimediation.org/how-to-become-imi-certified (establishing a credentialing program); 
Training and Development, CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS (CIArb), 
http://www.ciarb.org/training-and-development (establishing a “ladder of education” in domestic 
and international arbitration). 
22. Haas, supra note 15, at 16. 
23. See id. There is some debate as to whether the concept of epistemic communities can be
extended to include lawyers, although most recent research suggests that the term can indeed be 
extended to members of the legal profession. See Bianchi, supra note 8, at 6 (comparing Peter Haas, 
Ideas, Experts and Governance, in THE ROLE OF EXPERTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES: ADVISORS, DECISION MAKERS OR IRRELEVANT ACTORS? 26 
(Monika Ambrus et al. eds., 2014) (suggesting lawyers cannot constitute an epistemic community) 
and Olson, supra note 17, at 23 (“In many respects, the community of international lawyers 
provides a model example of Haas’s definition of an epistemic community of elites. This 
community views itself as a guild of accredited specialists engaged in the formation of society’s 
rules and uniquely qualified to interpret international law.”)); Ku, supra note 17, at 584 (concluding 
groups of lawyers can constitute an epistemic community). 
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through the community via professional conferences, journals, and other 
formal and informal collaborations.24 Transnational epistemic 
communities tend to advance their policy positions more effectively than 
national groups because transnational communities have larger 
networks.25 
At this point, “it is indisputable that the international arbitration 
world is an identifiable epistemic community that transcends national 
borders.”26 Indeed, numerous observers, beginning with Yves Dezalay 
and Bryant Garth in the mid-1980s, have characterized the international 
arbitral community as an “insider’s club” made up of knowledgeable 
specialists.27 Although some scholars believe that the community of 
arbitration experts developed as a result of economic rather than cultural 
factors,28 other commentators focus on the growth of various social 
networks as critical to the creation of an international body of like-
minded specialists.29 Certainly, it is true that a globally cohesive set of 
beliefs and practices has been facilitated and encouraged by the large 
number of specialty journals and conferences dedicated to international 
arbitration30 as well as the now-prevalent view of arbitration as the 
preferred, if not primary means, of resolving international commercial 
and investment disputes.31 As a result, international arbitration clearly 
24. See Haas, supra note 15, at 17; see also SLAUGHTER, supra note 17, at 65-100 
(describing the importance of networks in the international legal system). Some commentators have 
noted that transnational dispute resolution, which would include international commercial 
arbitration and international commercial mediation or conciliation, “foster[s] epistemic communities 
that bridge international and domestic legal cultures” and “are especially effective in norm 
transmission in comparison to State-to-State dispute settlement.” Christopher J. Borgen, 
Transnational Tribunals and the Transmission of Norms: The Hegemony of Process, 39 GEO.
WASH. INT’L L. REV. 685, 727 (2007). 
25. See Haas, supra note 15, at 17. 
26. Roger P. Alford, The American Influence on International Arbitration, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON 
DISP. RESOL. 69, 69 (2003). One question that may become important in the future is whether there 
are two arbitral communities, one made up of specialists in international commercial arbitration and 
one made up of specialists in international investment arbitration. See Anthea Roberts, Divergence 
Between Investment and Commercial Arbitration, 106 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 297, 297-99 (Mar. 
28-31, 2012). However, this point is not relevant to the current discussion. 
27. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE (1996). 
28. See Tom Ginsburg, The Culture of Arbitration, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1335, 1345
(2003). 
29. See Sergio Puig, Social Capital in the Arbitration Market, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 387, 389-
90 (2014). 
30. See S.I. STRONG, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION: SOURCES AND STRATEGIES 71-137 (2009) (noting sources); Rogers, supra note 21, 
at 1016.  
31. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 73 (2014). The
popularity of international arbitration is undeniable: according to recent estimates, up to ninety 
percent of all international commercial contracts include an arbitration provision with a similarly 
8
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reflects a common “set of causal approaches or orientations and . . .  
consensual knowledge base” and “shared normative commitments” that 
arise not as a result of a professional code of conduct but from a 
“principled approach to the issue at hand.”32 Thus, the field of 
international arbitration can be said to meet the definition of an 
epistemic community.33 
At this point, it is unclear whether and to what extent the same can 
be said of mediation. On the one hand, the field does appear to be 
populated by an expert group of “true believers,” at least in the United 
States, where specialists write glowingly of the advantages of mediation 
over other dispute resolution mechanisms, including arbitration.34 On the 
other hand, significant questions exist as to the breadth of the mediation 
community in terms of both geography and subject matter. For example, 
empirical research suggests that mediation runs a distant second to 
arbitration as the preferred means of resolving international business 
matters35 despite a number of efforts to expand the use of mediation in 
regions outside of the United States36 and in international commercial 
high rate (ninety-three percent) of adherence to some form of arbitration in the 3,000-5,000 
interstate investment treaties, including bilateral investment treaties (BITs), now in effect. 
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
PROVISIONS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A LARGE SAMPLE SURVEY 5, 9 
(2012), http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/50291678.pdf; Otto 
Sandrock, The Choice Between Forum Selection, Mediation and Arbitration Clauses: European 
Perspectives, 20 AM. REV. INT’L L. 7, 37 (2009); S.I. Strong, Mass Procedures as a Form of 
“Regulatory Arbitration” – Abaclat v. Argentine Republic and the International Investment 
Regime, 38 J. CORP. L. 259, 300 n.271 (2013). 
32. Haas, supra note 15, at 19; see also id. at 2-3 (listing four core attributes of an epistemic 
community). This feature is particularly relevant to arbitration and mediation because those fields 
have developed largely autonomously. Neither mediation nor arbitration can be said to exist 
“outside” the law, since the state always retains an interest in overseeing various procedural matters, 
but the amount of autonomy given to parties in mediation and arbitration is often significant. See 
S.I. Strong, Discovery Under 28 U.S.C. §1782: Distinguishing International Commercial
Arbitration and International Investment Arbitration, 1 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 295, 323-50 
(2013). 
33. See Alford, supra note 26, at 69; Haas, supra note 15, at 19. 
34. See Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It’s Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 81, 83 (noting near-universal belief among mediation experts that mediation is the 
best means of resolving disputes). 
35. See S.I. Strong, Realizing Rationality: An Empirical Assessment of International
Commercial Mediation, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1973 (2016) [hereinafter Strong, Empirical]. 
36. This effort has met with mixed results. See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Is Europe
Headed Down the Primrose Path with Mandatory Mediation?, 37 N.C. J. INT’L & COM. REG. 981, 
982-85 (2012) [hereinafter Nolan-Haley, Primrose Path] (discussing reception of mediation in
Europe pursuant to various measures, including Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on Certain Aspects of Mediation in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 2008 O.J. (L 136) 3); Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The Best and Worst of
Times, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 731, 736 (2015). 
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and investment disputes.37 
One way to resolve this tension might be to conclude that an 
epistemic community exists, but only with respect to domestic mediation 
in the United States.38 However, a number of recent initiatives on the 
international front suggest that an international community of mediation 
experts may be in existence, even if that group is not as large or as 
powerful as the international arbitral community. For example, the 
creation of the International Mediation Institute (IMI) and the 
development of a Global Pound Conference that puts mediation and 
conciliation on equal footing with arbitration and litigation suggest that 
experts in international commercial mediation are growing in 
international sophistication and influence.39 Similar conclusions can be 
drawn from the increasing number of journals interested in scholarship 
concerning international commercial mediation and conciliation,40 as 
well as the creation of several international student moots in this area of 
law.41 These types of communal activities are critical to the creation and 
37. See Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 14-15. Some studies have suggested that people
involved in civil lawsuits prefer mediation to nonbinding arbitration at the early stages of the 
dispute. See Donna Shestowsky, The Psychology of Procedural Preference: How Litigants Evaluate 
Legal Procedures Ex Ante, 99 IOWA L. REV. 637, 648-49 (2014). 
38. Although the mediation community within the United States does not appear to have
described itself as an epistemic community, at least in so many words, the extensive amount of 
literature on mediation and the increasing sophistication of the process suggests that the necessary 
expertise and consensus as to the core values of commercial mediation exists. See Strong, 
Empirical, supra note 35 (citing literature on mediation and particularly on commercial mediation). 
A slightly different type of epistemic community is said to exist with respect to inter-state 
mediation, which arises as a matter of public international law rather than private international law. 
See RAYMOND COHEN, CULTURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, in RESOLVING
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEDIATION, 107, 111 (Jacob 
Berkovitch ed., 1996); see also Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 25 (discussing interstate mediation). 
39. See IMI, https://imimediation.org/ (last visited February 21, 2017).; Global Pound
Conference Series 2016-2017, http://globalpoundconference.org/. The Global Pound Conference is 
being organized by IMI, which may not only help “promote interaction and shared beliefs” within 
the international dispute resolution community but may also place members of IMI “advantageously 
with respect to the decision-making and negotiating process.” Sebenius, supra note 9, at 362. 
40. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ARBITRATION, MEDIATION AND DISPUTE 
MANAGEMENT; JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT; NON-JUDICIAL DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS, STUDIES IN TRANSACTIONAL 
ECONOMIC LAW (Norbert Horn & Joseph J. Norton eds., 2000); STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL 
MEDIATION 213-27 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 2002). 
41. International commercial mediation moots are organized by both the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the International Bar Association in conjunction with the Vienna 
International Arbitral Centre. The development of the international commercial arbitration 
community has been greatly assisted by the popularity of international mooting competitions for law 
students. See Mark L. Shulman, Making Progress: How Eric Bergsten and the Vis Moot Advance 
the Enterprise of Universal Peace, 24 PACE INT’L L. REV. 1, 5 (2012) (“The Vis Moot is justly 
renowned for assembling more law students and lawyers in one place at one time than any other 
10
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maintenance of an epistemic community, since that is how members of 
such groups develop and promote their common agendas.42 
Empirical, comparative, and historical analyses also support the 
notion that an epistemic community involving international commercial 
mediation exists. For example, empirical research suggests that most 
experts in international commercial mediation reside in England rather 
than in the United States,43 while a comparative study conducted by the 
UNCITRAL Secretariat demonstrates the extent to which mediation 
exists around the world.44 Furthermore, the rise of international 
commercial mediation cannot be considered a recent development, since 
mediation and conciliation were the primary means of resolving 
international commercial disputes prior to World War II.45 As a result, it 
may be that the field of international commercial mediation constitutes a 
nascent epistemic community whose membership is small, particularly 
in comparison to the international commercial arbitration community, 
but highly motivated.46 
While the rise of a new epistemic group focusing on international 
commercial mediation could initially be seen as benefitting efforts to 
create a new UNCITRAL instrument on mediated settlement 
agreements, the situation is actually much more complicated, since 
“[t]he solidarity of epistemic community members derives not only from 
their shared interests . . . but also their shared aversions.”47 This feature 
such competition.”). 
42. See Haas, supra note 15, at 19. 
43. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35. 
44. See United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Settlement of Commercial
Disputes: Enforceability of Settlement Agreements Resulting From International Commercial 
Mediation/Conciliation – Compilation of Comments by Governments, prepared for the 62nd through 
64th Sessions of Working Group II, (2000-2017) [hereinafter Working Group II Comparative 
Study]. Similar material has been collected by the World Bank. See WORLD BANK, INVESTING
ACROSS BORDERS (2012). Mediation and conciliation have long been favored in various Asian 
cultures. See Shahla F. Ali, Approaching the Global Arbitration Table: Comparing the Advantages 
of Arbitration as Seen by Practitioners in East Asia and the West, 28 REV. LITIG. 791, 796-97 
(2009). 
45. See Eric A. Schwartz, International Conciliation and the ICC, 10 ICSID REV.-FOREIGN 
INVEST. L.J. 98, 99, 107 (1995). The rise of international commercial arbitration in the post-War 
period can be largely attributed to the success of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards (New York Convention). See United Nations 
Convention of the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, U.N. Doc 
E/CONF.26/8/Rev.1 [hereinafter New York Convention]; Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 13. 
46. Thus, in a recent empirical study of the use and perception of international commercial
mediation, only nine percent of the respondents indicated that they had been involved in more than 
twenty international commercial mediations in the last three years. See Strong, Empirical, supra 
note 35, at 26.  
47. Haas, supra note 15, at 20. 
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is critically important to the future of the proposed treaty at UNCITRAL 
because of the way in which the arbitration and mediation communities 
view each other. For example, supporters of international commercial 
arbitration often denigrate mediation as a “soft” procedural mechanism 
that has few benefits and numerous disadvantages.48 Conversely, 
proponents of mediation criticize arbitration as being incapable of 
providing certain key benefits (such as the preservation of ongoing 
relationships and the development of integrative solutions).49 The 
apparent absence of common ground and a certain amount of reciprocal 
ill-will between the two groups not only precludes the possibility of 
having numerous individuals with influence and standing in both 
communities, but also could drive the arbitration community to attempt 
to block efforts at UNCITRAL to adopt a new treaty on international 
commercial mediation. 
III. EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES AND THE UNCITRAL PROCESS
A. Epistemic Communities in International Lawmaking Processes
Recognizing the different factions within the international dispute
resolution community can be very useful to state delegations at 
UNCITRAL, since it can help them develop strategies to manage such 
conflicts. Before doing so, however, negotiators must appreciate how 
epistemic communities operate in the international lawmaking process. 
Epistemic communities gain political power as a result of their 
“professional training, prestige, and reputation for expertise in an area 
highly valued by society or elite decision makers.”50 The need for expert 
assistance is particularly marked in highly technical areas that require 
international coordination.51 In those situations, policymakers look to 
48. For example, those who do not use mediation often believe it is contrary to the dispute
resolution culture in their home countries. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35. Furthermore, no 
studies have yet shown that mediation actually saves parties time and money, which creates some 
skepticism in the arbitral community about whether mediation is worthwhile. See id.  
49. See Thomas Gaultier, Cross-Border Mediation: A New Solution for International
Commercial Settlement?, 26 INT’L PRACTICUM 38, 50-51 (2013). The notion of “integrative 
solutions” (also known as win-win scenarios or “value claiming”) is most closely associated with 
Roger Fisher and William Uhry, authors of the 1981 text, Getting to Yes, although the concept 
actually dates back to the early 1900s. See ROGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (2d ed., 1992); Charles B. Craver, The Inherent Tension Between 
Value Creation and Value Claiming During Bargaining Interactions, 12 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 1, 9 (2010).  
50. Haas, supra note 15, at 17 (noting these elements are supplemented by various “tests of
validity”). 
51. See id. at 1; see also Emmanuel Adler & Peter M. Haas, Conclusion: Epistemic
12
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epistemic communities to help state actors fulfill their roles as 
“uncertainty reducers” and “power and wealth pursuers.”52 
These attributes are self-evident in matters involving UNCITRAL. 
For example, UNCITRAL’s core purpose is to decrease cross-border 
commercial uncertainty and increase global wealth and prosperity.53 
UNCITRAL achieves these ends by relying heavily on technical 
expertise generated institutionally (for example, through the 
UNCITRAL Secretariat and various working groups) and through input 
from external bodies, including the numerous IGOs and NGOs that 
participate in the UNCITRAL process.54 The need for technical 
expertise is particularly high in fields such as private international 
dispute resolution, which require an extensive understanding not only of 
the relevant underlying law but also a detailed appreciation of how 
various national and international laws interact as a comparative and 
international matter.55 
Epistemic communities provide critical assistance to international 
policymakers by “articulating the cause-and-effect relationships of 
complex problems, helping states identify their interests, framing the 
issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, and identifying 
Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program, 46 INT’L ORG. 
367, 371 (1992) (defining “the role played by epistemic communities as one of policy 
coordination,” which is subsequently defined as “consent and mutual expectation”). 
52. Haas, supra note 15, at 4. Epistemic communities provide policymakers with useful
“depictions of social or physical processes, their interrelation with other processes, and the likely 
consequences of actions that require application of considerable scientific or technical expertise.” 
Id. (noting the information “is the product of human interpretations of social and physical 
phenomena”). 
53. For example, UNCITRAL’s aim is to increase predictability in international commercial
relations while also maximizing cost-efficiency in international commercial transactions and 
facilitating international trade. See G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, 
U.N. Doc. A/6594, at pmbl (Dec. 17, 1966) (establishing UNCITRAL); A GUIDE TO UNCITRAL: 
BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION 1 (2013) 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/general/12-57491-Guide-to-UNCITRAL-e.pdf 
[hereinafter UNCITRAL GUIDE].  
54. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 53, at 6-9; Haas, supra note 15, at 10 (describing the 
United Nations as requiring a high degree of technical expertise); see also id. at 32 (noting “the 
coordinating role of members of international secretariats and of governmental and non-
governmental bodies and the channels through which they interact”); C. Cora True-Frost, The 
Security Council and Norm Consumption, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 115, 142-43 (2007) 
(noting epistemic communities have affected significant change in policy and practice at the United 
Nations, often through NGOs).  
55. This is a field that even judges have difficulty understanding. See S.I. STRONG,
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A GUIDE FOR U.S. JUDGES 1-24 (2012) (involving a 
judicial guide published by the Federal Judicial Center, the research and education arm of the U.S. 
federal judiciary, that is meant to provide assistance to U.S. judges in this area of law). 
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salient points for negotiation.”56 However, epistemic communities do 
more than simply help create and coordinate international policy;57 they 
also participate in the juris-generative process, which would include 
initiatives to adopt international treaties such as the proposed convention 
on enforcement of mediated settlement agreements.58 
Epistemic communities are often at their best when they are either 
engaged in the direct identification of state interests for decision makers 
or highlighting the relevant features of a particular issue so that 
policymakers may determine whether they have an interest at stake.59 As 
one scholar has noted, “epistemic communities fix the terms of the 
discourse and shape the way in which we look at international law.”60 
Once one state has successfully completed this process, that state may 
influence the actions of other states, thereby multiplying the effect of the 
epistemic community.61 
This process perfectly describes the process by which the idea for 
the proposed convention on enforcement of mediated settlement 
agreements arose and was developed by the U.S. Department of State. 
The project began as a result of a suggestion made by a participant at a 
February 2014 meeting of the U.S. State Department’s Advisory 
Committee on Private International Law.62 After considering the matter 
56. Haas, supra note 15, at 2. 
57. The consensual nature of UNCITRAL makes it one of the quintessential examples of
international policy coordination. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 53, at 6; Haas, supra note 15, 
at 32. No votes are taken to determine the direction taken by UNCITRAL or any of its constituent 
bodies. Instead, the chair of the meeting in question (i.e., the full Commission, which meets once a 
year in June or July, or the various working groups, which meet twice a year) simply gauges the 
mood of the room when determining whether to move forward and in what manner. See 
UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 53, at 7. 
58. See Paul Schiff Berman, A Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L.
301, 322 (2007) (discussing the work of Harold Hongju Koh and Robert Cover, among others); 
Anne Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 
283, 324 (2004) (“The procedures and substantive principles developed over the course of repeated 
conflicts among the same or successive actors take on precedential weight, both through learning 
processes and the pragmatic necessity of building on experience. As they become increasingly 
refined, these procedures and principles are increasingly likely to be codified in informal and 
increasingly formal ways.”). UNCITRAL and Working Group II have illustrated a keen desire to 
reflect and incorporate both formal and informal norms relating to international commercial 
mediation. See Working Group II Comparative Study, supra note 44.  
59. See Haas, supra note 15, at 4; see also Bianchi, supra note 8, at 19 (“To fix the
boundaries of what international law is and to set the parameters for what is or is not an acceptable 
argument is no less than making the law.”). 
60. Bianchi, supra note 8, at 16. 
61. See Haas, supra note 15, at 4; see also id. at 33 (noting “epistemic communities operating 
through transnationally applied policy networks can prove influential in policy coordination”). 
62. See PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3452.htm; PUBLIC MEETING ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND 
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internally and consulting with additional experts and stakeholders, the 
State Department shaped the idea into a form that State Department 
lawyers believed would most likely meet with international approval. 
The proposal was formally presented at the July 2014 meeting of 
UNCITRAL, and deliberations regarding the proposal are now 
underway in Working Group II, which focuses on matters involving 
international commercial arbitration and conciliation.63 Various 
members of the arbitration and mediation communities have engaged in 
the debate about a new international instrument in this area of law 
through interactions with their government representatives and direct 
participation as NGO observers at UNCITRAL.64 
Epistemic communities do more than influence the creation of new 
policy initiatives. Instead, as the current deliberations at UNCITRAL 
show, epistemic communities play an ongoing role in the debate about 
the shape of various international policy programs. Expert perspectives 
can enter the process in several ways. First, specialist knowledge may be 
sought at the institutional level, as occurs when the UNCITRAL 
Secretariat asks for the views of internal and external experts on various 
CONCILIATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/l/229037.htm. The original 
suggestion to the State Department was based on information found in a scholarly article written by 
the current author. Compare Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 11-39 with U.S. Proposal, supra note 1. 
However, the proposition was consistent with work of other commentators that came out shortly 
thereafter. See Boule, supra note 5, at 65; Li, supra note 5, at 20; Lo, supra note 5, at 135; Wolski, 
supra note 5, at 110. Interestingly, this latter group of authors appear to work primarily in the area 
of mediation rather than arbitration, which supports the notion that an epistemic community of 
experts in international commercial mediation is on the rise. See Haas, supra note 15, at 4 (“The 
members of a prevailing [epistemic] community become strong actors at the national and 
transnational level as decision makers solicit their information and delegate responsibility to 
them.”). 
63. See U.S. Proposal, supra note 1; see also supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text
(discussing UNCITRAL deliberations to date). 
64. See, e.g., 81 Fed. Reg. 50,591-92 (2016) (containing notice of a public meeting of the
U.S. Department of State Advisory Committee on Private International Law (ACPIL) to discuss the 
proposed treaty on international settlement agreements). A wide variety of IGOs and NGOs sit in on 
UNCITRAL deliberations, including generalist organizations like the American Bar Association 
(ABA), the American Society of International Law (ASIL), the European Union (EU), the 
International Institute on Conflict Prevention & Resolution (CPR Institute) and the International 
Law Association (ILA), and numerous international arbitration organizations, including the 
American Arbitration Association/International Centre for Dispute Resolution (AAA/ICDR), the 
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), the International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the International Council on Commercial Arbitration (ICCA), the 
New York International Arbitration Center (NYIAC), the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), 
and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), among others. Although many of the arbitral 
institutions are tangentially involved in international commercial mediation, at the time of writing 
only one NGO at UNCITRAL, the International Mediation Institute (IMI), focuses primarily on 
mediation and conciliation. 
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technical issues.65 Second, epistemic communities may exert indirect 
influence on the international debate, as occurs when states seek the 
assistance of stakeholders and national experts in analyzing policy 
proposals and counterproposals submitted by other states as part of the 
“transgovernmental communication” process.66 Third, state delegations 
to UNCITRAL are often made up of subject matter specialists who are 
drawn from other government agencies or from a cadre of well-
connected (i.e., elite) academics and private practitioners.67 
Recourse to expert advisors does not necessarily result in 
straightforward results, since epistemic communities are not the holders 
of absolute truths.68 Instead, epistemic communities “bring with them 
their interpretations of the knowledge, which are in turn based on their 
causally informed vision of reality and their notions of validity.”69 As a 
result, the content of the advice given by any expert consultant varies 
depending on that person’s perspective, training, and background.70 
Furthermore, different states react differently to information provided by 
specialist advisors.71 Therefore, reliance on epistemic communities does 
not guarantee a conflict-free negotiation process. To the contrary, 
65. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 53, at 7; see also supra note 54 and accompanying
text (discussing NGOs and the UNCITRAL Secretariat). The preliminary report from an empirical 
study written by the author was also made available to delegates and was cited by the Secretariat 
and various governments in their submissions. See Secretariat Note, supra note 2, at 6 n.16; Initial 
States’ Comments, supra note 2, at 6 n.7; S.I. Strong, Use and Perception of International 
Commercial Mediation and Conciliation: A Preliminary Report of Issues Relating to the Proposed 
UNCITRAL Convention on International Commercial Mediation and Conciliation, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2526302. The preliminary report was also 
discussed orally during the Working Group meeting. See UNCITRAL, WORKING GROUP II, SOUND
RECORDINGS OF MEETINGS, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html. 
66. Cho & Kelly, supra note 7, at 503 (quoting ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, 
POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 25-26 (1977)); see also 81 Fed. Reg. 50, 591-92 (2016) (containing 
notice of a public meeting ACPIL seeking stakeholder input on the proposed treaty on international 
settlement agreements); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 503, 513 (1995) (discussing transgovernmental communication in a combined 
theory of international law and international relations). 
67. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 53, at 8; Haas, supra note 15, at 13 (contemplating
this process in the abstract); see also id. at 35 (noting members of an epistemic community “may be 
found among the respected experts whose names recur on delegation lists to intergovernmental 
meetings or among those responsible for drafting background reports or briefing diplomats”). 
68. See Haas, supra note 15, at 21; see also id. at 23 (“The primary concern is the political
influence that an epistemic community can have on collective policymaking, rather than the 
correctness of the advice given. While epistemic communities provide consensual knowledge, they 
do not necessarily generate truth.”). 
69. See id. at 21. 
70. See id.
71. See id. at 30.
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significant debates about the proper course of action can arise both 
within and between different epistemic communities. 
Applying this knowledge to the current deliberations at 
UNCITRAL suggests a potentially significant divergence of opinion 
regarding the need for and shape of a new instrument involving 
international commercial mediation, based on the background of the 
experts in question. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that most of 
the debate about the substantive details of the proposed convention is 
taking place in Working Group II.72 Although that Working Group 
ostensibly focuses on matters involving both arbitration and conciliation 
(i.e., mediation), historically the group was dedicated to international 
commercial arbitration, and most of the NGOs involved in Working 
Group II specialize in arbitration, not mediation.73 Furthermore, most of 
the members of national delegations to Working Group II have 
experience in arbitration rather than mediation, although the composition 
of state delegations can change from meeting to meeting.74 
The high proportion of arbitration experts in Working Group II is 
troubling because the arbitration community could use its influence to 
derail the proposed convention if a sufficient number of arbitral experts 
view that initiative as contrary to their principles or interests. For 
example, the arbitration community may find the proposed convention 
offensive to a belief that arbitration is the best, if not only, way to 
resolve international commercial and investment disputes.75 
Alternatively, some specialists in arbitration could perceive the proposed 
convention as a threat to their financial interests, since the convention is 
intended to increase the viability of mediation as a means of resolving 
cross-border business disputes.76 If the world of international dispute 
resolution is framed in distributive terms (i.e., as a zero-sum equation 
where the increase of mediation decreases the incidence of arbitration), 
specialists in arbitration could be wary of supporting a procedure that 
72. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 53, at 46; see also UNCITRAL, WORKING GROUP II, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/2Arbitration.html. 
73. For example, only one of the NGOs in attendance (IMI) specializes in mediation. The
other IGOs and NGOs focus primarily on arbitration. See supra note 64 (listing various IGOs and 
NGOs).  
74. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 53, at 8. At this point, there is little overlap between
experts in mediation, including international commercial mediation, and experts in public 
international law.  
75. See infra note 122 and accompanying text. 
76. See Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 31-32 (noting that a new convention could put
mediation and arbitration on equal footing); see also Boule, supra note 5, at 65; Lo, supra note 5, at 
135 (suggesting a new enforcement regime); Madoff, supra note 5, at 161-66 (noting the need for a 
new treaty); Wolski, supra note 5, at 110 (supporting a new treaty).  
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could detrimentally affect their livelihood.77 
The arbitral community may also harbor some residual antipathy to 
the proposed convention on mediation because the business 
community’s recent interest in international commercial mediation is 
often seen to be the result of parties’ growing dissatisfaction with 
international arbitration.78 For years, the international commercial actors 
have bemoaned the increasing cost and delays of international 
commercial and investment arbitration.79 While the arbitral community 
has attempted to solve the problem through various initiatives intended 
to reform the arbitral process from the inside, those efforts have not been 
entirely successful,80 and an increasing number of parties have expressed 
a desire to exit the arbitral system81 through mediation.82 
This sort of crisis is precisely the type of catalyst that can trigger a 
quantum shift in international policy.83 Indeed, “it often takes a crisis or 
shock to overcome institutional inertia and habit and spur 
[policymakers] to seek help from an epistemic community. In some 
cases, information generated by an epistemic community may in fact 
77. See infra notes 122, 127-29 and accompanying text. 
78. See Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation: The “New Arbitration,” 17 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 61, 64-66 (2012) [hereinafter Nolan-Haley, New Arbitration]. 
79. See WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRATION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES: STUDIES 
IN LAW AND PRACTICE 3-27 (2d. ed. 2012).  
80. See id; Rivkin, supra note 14; Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 11; see also COLLEGE OF
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS, PROTOCOLS FOR EXPEDITIOUS, COST-EFFECTIVE COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION (Thomas J. Stipanowich et al. eds., 2010); ICC COMMISSION, REPORT ON 
TECHNIQUES FOR CONTROLLING TIME AND COSTS IN ARBITRATION (2012).  
81. The concept of exit has been frequently discussed in the context of litigation. See Owen 
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1087 (1984); Jeffrey R. Seul, Settling Significant 
Cases, 79 WASH. L. REV. 881, 885-86 (2004); Jay Tidmarsh, Exiting Litigation, 41 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 263, 267 (2010). However, the issue has also been raised in the context of international
investment arbitration, where states have exhibited a desire to exit the system by withdrawing from
or refusing to enter into bilateral investment treaties. See Karen Halverson Cross, Converging 
Trends in Investment Treaty Practice, 38 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 151, 164, 220-24, 228
(2012); Anna T. Katselas, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 93 NEB. L.
REV. 313, 335-47 (2014); Leon E. Trakman, The ICSID Under Siege, 45 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 603, 
604-05 (2012). Some law and economics analyses have been conducted concerning the choice to
proceed in international commercial arbitration versus transnational litigation. See Peter B.
Rutledge, Convergence and Divergence in International Dispute Resolution, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL.
49, 50. However, no known theoretical analyses compare the choice to use mediation versus
arbitration, particularly in the international commercial sphere. But see Stipanowich & Lamare,
supra note 21, at 44-54 (conducting an empirical study including international commercial
mediation); Strong, Empirical, supra note 35 (conducting an empirical study focusing solely on
international commercial mediation). 
82. See Nolan-Haley, New Arbitration, supra note 78, at 64-66.
83. See Haas, supra note 15, at 14 (noting “[d]ecision makers do not always recognize that
their understanding of complex issues and linkages is limited”); see also id. at 15-16 (discussing 
how epistemic communities assist with the process of change).  
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create a shock.”84 
When considering the possibility of change, it is important to 
consider the relative sophistication of the field in question, since 
technical experts are most influential in areas where policymakers have 
relatively few preconceptions about the area in which regulation is 
occurring.85 This phenomenon may prove problematic with respect to 
the current U.S. proposal, since UNCITRAL has addressed enforcement 
of settlement agreements arising out of conciliation on a number of 
previous occasions, leading some skeptics to suggest that the field is 
already saturated.86 As a result, the views of various experts may not be 
as persuasive regarding the current debate as they might otherwise have 
been. 
84. Id. at 14. 
85. See id. at 29.
86. See United Nations on International Trade Law Working Group on Arbitration, Report of
the Secretary General, Settlement of Commercial Disputes - Possible Uniform Rules on Certain 
Issues Concerning Settlement of Commercial Disputes: Written Form for Arbitration Agreement, 
Interim Measures of Protection, Conciliation, paras. 105-12, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.110 
(Sept. 22, 2002); United Nations General Assembly, Report of the thirty-fifth session of the 
Commission, U.N. G.A.O.R. Fifty-seventh Sess., Supp. No. 17, paras. 119-26, 172, U.N. Doc. 
A/57/17 (June 17-18, 2002); United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Draft Guide 
to Enactment and Use of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation, 
paras. 77-81, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/514 (May 27, 2002); United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law, Report of the Working Group on Arbitration on the Work of its Thirty-fifth Session, 
paras. 38-48, 133-39, 160-61, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/506 (Dec. 21, 2001); United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law, Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial 
Disputes – Draft Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL, paras. 66-17, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.116 (Oct. 21, 2001); United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 
Note by the UNCITRAL Secretariat, Settlement of Commercial Disputes - Model Legislative 
Provisions on International Commercial Conciliation, paras. 45-49, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.115 (Sept. 18, 2001); United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 
Report of the Working Group on Arbitration on the Work of its Thirty-fourth Session, paras. 153-
59, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/487 (June 15, 2001); United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law, Report of the Secretary General, Settlement of Commercial Disputes – Preparation of Uniform 
Provisions on: Written Form for Arbitration Agreements, Interim Measures of Protection, and 
Conciliation, at n.39, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.113/Add.1 (Mar. 9, 2001); United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law, Report of the Working Group on Arbitration on the Work 
of its Thirty-second Session, paras. 38-40, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/468 (Apr. 10, 2000); United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law, Report of the Secretary General, Settlement of 
Commercial Disputes – Possible Uniform Rules on Certain Issues Concerning Settlement of 
Commercial Disputes: Conciliation, Interim Measures of Protection, Written Form for Arbitration 
Agreement, paras. 34-42, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.II/WP.108 (Jan. 14, 2000); United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law, Notes by UNCITRAL Secretariat, Possible Future Work 
in the Area of International Commercial Arbitration, paras. 16-18, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/460 (Apr. 6, 
1999). However, commentators have criticized UNCITRAL’s failure to address issues relating to 
the international enforceability of an international settlement agreement in these earlier efforts. See 
PIETER SANDERS, THE WORK OF UNCITRAL ON ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION 234 (2d ed., 
2004). 
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Furthermore, recognizing that change is necessary does not always 
mean that experts agree on how such change should occur. Therefore, 
the following section discusses how negotiation theory can both describe 
and diminish the struggle between the various epistemic communities 
involved in the current UNCITRAL treaty process. 
B. Epistemic Communities and Negotiation Theory
Conflicts between different epistemic communities (or different
factions of the same epistemic community) can be difficult for 
policymakers who are seeking expert guidance in a particular 
policymaking endeavor.87 However, conflict is not necessarily a bad 
thing. Indeed, reliance on a single epistemic community can lead to 
significant negative repercussions, including the failure to consider 
potentially helpful interdisciplinary perspectives.88 
Relatively few commentators have considered how epistemic 
communities play into standard theories of bargaining.89 Instead, most 
analyses of international law and international relations focus on game 
theory.90 However, application of a negotiation-analytic perspective91 
can overcome problems associated with other theoretic models.92 
87. See Berman, supra note 58, at 327 (discussing Robert Cover’s views regarding global
legal processes and “the inevitable conflicts of norms articulated by multiple communities”); see 
also Bianchi, supra note 8, at 17 (discussing different analytical approaches adopted by 
international arbitrators, as considered further in Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and 
Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45 (2013)); Kali Murray & 
Ellen van Zimmeren, Dynamic Patent Governance in Europe and the United States: The Myriad 
Example, 19 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 287, 299, 308-13 (2011) (discussing such conflicts in 
patent law); Frédéric G. Sourgens, Law’s Laboratory: Developing International Law on Investment 
Protection As Common Law, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 181, 205 (2014) (noting discrepancies in 
international investment community); S.I. Strong, The Future of Trust Arbitration: Quo Vadis? in 
ARBITRATION OF TRUST DISPUTES: ISSUES IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW paras. 22.09-
22.23 (S.I. Strong ed., 2016) (discussing such conflicts in internal trust arbitration). 
88. See Bianchi, supra note 8, at 17-18 (discussing how successful integration of different
epistemic groups can shape the formation of international law); Haas, supra note 15, at 24. 
89. See Sebenius, supra note 9, at 326. 
90. See Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV. 167, 
184 (1999) (“As suggested by Robert Putnam, the structure of international negotiations is a two-
level game simultaneously played by government representatives at the international level with the 
representatives of the foreign governments and at the domestic level with representatives of 
domestic interest groups.”).  
91. See Sebenius, supra note 9, at 325, 351. Negotiation theorists differ from game theorists
in that the former “typically assume intelligent, goal-seeking action by the other players but not full 
strategic rationality.” Id. at 350 (noting game theorists “assume that players are fully rational and 
analyze their actions by equilibrium methods that calculate what each should optimally do given the 
others’ optimal choices”).  
92. For example, negotiation theory can provide a response to “suboptimal ‘cooperation’ in 
20
Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 3, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol50/iss3/4
2016] CLASH OF CULTURES 515 
Furthermore, reliance on the concept of epistemic communities can be 
useful not only in overcoming “‘strategic misrepresentation’ of interests 
and beliefs” that can result in agreements that “fall far short of the Pareto 
frontier,”93 but also in describing how learning can occur among the 
state parties during the negotiation process.94 
Obviously, an epistemic community’s ability to influence policy 
change increases in direct proportion to the cohesiveness of the group 
and its access to the relevant policymakers.95 However, epistemic 
communities that are involved in the international negotiation process 
can also be said to 
constitute a de facto natural coalition seeking to build a “winning coa-
lition” of support behind its preferred policy choice. . . . Not only must 
the epistemic coalition convince a sufficient number of actors to join 
by various means of inducement, but it must also overcome actual and 
potential “blocking coalitions” by a variety of standard direct and indi-
rect approaches, including prevention, persuasion, conversion, dividing 
and conquering, isolating and overwhelming, and simply outmaneuver-
ing and outflanking opponents.96 
This characterization of the role of epistemic communities in the 
international policymaking process is critical to a proper understanding 
of the ongoing deliberations at UNCITRAL because the international 
dispute resolution community can no longer be described as a single, 
unitary entity. Furthermore, this view of epistemic communities 
highlights the need to consider whether and to what extent the arbitral 
and mediation communities will cooperate during the UNCITRAL 
deliberations on the proposed treaty on mediated settlements. 
the presence of distributional conflict,” termed “cooperation below the Pareto frontier,” which is “a 
general phenomenon and [which] tends to occur when the cooperative potential of a situation is not 
realized because of technical or strategic uncertainty, a lack of creativity, blocked communication, 
or other factors.” Id. at 327. 
93. Id. at 331 (noting that although agreements may arise in some contexts, “the adversarial
nature of the process may make potentially valuable learning and joint problem-solving effectively 
impossible”).  
94. See id. at 327, 329. 
95. See id. at 361-62 (noting also that “[t]o the extent that a community falls short of these
conditions, policy entrepreneurs may take steps to foster its growth and potential influence”). 
96. Id. at 352. Epistemic coalitions based on shared beliefs are “less familiar” than coalitions
based on “shared material interest, common histories or relationships, identical ideologies, common 
enemies and the like” but may nevertheless be quite “potent.” Id. at 355. It is critically important to 
understand the effect of coalition-building behavior in multiparty negotiations, such as those that 
exist at UNCITRAL. Lawrence E. Susskind & Larry Crump, Editors’ Introduction—Multiparty 
Negotiation: An Emerging Field of Study and New Specialization, in 1 MULTIPARTY NEGOTIATION:
COMPLEX LITIGATION AND LEGAL TRANSACTIONS xxv, xxv (Lawrence E. Susskind & Larry Crump 
eds., 2008).  
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Other aspects of the UNCITRAL process also validate this theoretic 
model. For example, one premise suggests that members of epistemic 
communities work indirectly, since they tend not to negotiate directly 
with colleagues in other countries.97 This phenomenon is certainly 
apparent in the ongoing UNCITRAL process, where specialists in 
arbitration and mediation are not meeting directly to resolve their 
differences regarding the proposed convention but instead to pass their 
positions on to state and NGO delegates, who present the arguments on 
the floor of the United Nations. 
However, there are some ways in which the UNCITRAL process 
defies standard expectations. For example, some theorists have 
suggested that epistemic communities seldom act as “an overt, cross-
cutting bloc that self-consciously coordinates tactics and strategy.”98 
However, a significant amount of strategic coordination appears to be 
going on among various NGOs interested in the proposed UNCITRAL 
convention.99 
One of the key functions of having epistemic communities involved 
in international policymaking involves the experts’ ability to help 
negotiators identify shared interests that will then lead to agreement on 
various substantive issues.100 However, epistemic communities also play 
a critical role in ensuring the success of the final outcome by helping 
parties see the benefits of continuing to cooperate in the implementation 
of a particular agreement.101 
97. See Sebenius, supra note 9, at 352. 
98. Id. at 353. 
99. For example, IMI has been extremely active in supporting the UNCITRAL process
through various empirical studies and lobbying efforts. See, e.g., IMI, How Users View the Proposal 
for a UN Convention on the Enforcement of Mediated Settlements (Dec. 3, 2014), 
https://imimediation.org/uncitral-survey-results-news-item; IMI, Survey – UN Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Mediated Settlement Agreements (Oct. 16, 2014), 
https://imimediation.org/invitation-to-participate-in-survey-for-uncitral. The notion that epistemic 
communities do not act strategically may be the result of the assumption that lawyers cannot form 
epistemic communities. See supra note 23. However, it is not surprising that an epistemic 
community made up completely or primarily of lawyers would be capable of operating in a strategic 
manner. 
100. See Haas, supra note 15, at 20; Sebenius, supra note 9, at 354-55 (“[E]pistemic 
communities may frame issues for collective debate, propose specific policies, and identify salient 
dimensions for negotiations, while excluding others.”). 
101. See Sebenius, supra note 9, at 354. Thus, it has been said that an
epistemic coalition shares a common policy project, which can be interpreted as a pro-
posed agreement. Over time, learning alters the zone of possible agreement, such that the 
community’s preferred policy is widely seen to embody a greater degree of joint gains
and the alternatives to agreement are seen as less desirable. Thus, the conflict of inter-
est . . . inherent in previous perceptions of the zone of possible agreement is reduced, and 
cooperation becomes not only more likely to be achieved but also more likely to persist
22
Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 3, Art. 4
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol50/iss3/4
2016] CLASH OF CULTURES 517 
Cooperative efforts within and between the members of various 
epistemic communities is of course ideal. However, expert groups do not 
always behave in a supportive manner. Instead, as mentioned previously, 
some epistemic communities involved in international lawmaking 
operate as a type of blocking coalition.102 This is a significant concern 
for those involved in the proposed UNCITRAL convention, since it is 
possible that some members of either the arbitration or mediation 
communities might seek to thwart the forward movement of the U.S. 
proposal.103 The risk of a successful blocking effort rises to the extent 
that a particular group is well-mobilized and well-situated to influence 
state delegates.104 
The tension between cooperative and oppositional efforts may be 
exacerbated or reduced depending on how the particular debate is 
framed. For example, some epistemic communities may assert a more 
distributive approach (sometimes referred to as “value-claiming”) while 
others may adopt more of an integrative approach (sometimes referred to 
as “value-creating”).105 Applying these negotiation-oriented principles to 
the current deliberations at UNCITRAL yield some very interesting 
results, as the following section shows. 
IV. EPISTEMIC COMMUNITIES, NEGOTIATION THEORY AND THE
UNCITRAL PROCESS 
Although the interests of the international arbitration community 
may seem to diverge from those of the mediation community, the split is 
not necessarily fatal to the UNCITRAL process. International 
policymakers routinely “negotiate with and among multiple epistemic 
communities” and “enroll their various audiences and allies, 
emphasizing particular aspects of their plans to members of diverse 
epistemic communities.”106 Nevertheless, actual or perceived conflicts 
between the values and interests of the international arbitration and 
mediation communities may create difficulties,107 since “the greater the 
once achieved. 
Id. 
102. See id. at 359; see also supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
103. See infra notes 121-22, 152-54 and accompanying text.
104. Sebenius, supra note 9, at 360 (quoting Emanuel Adler and Peter Haas); see also id. at
359 (noting shortfalls of other theories). 
105. Id. at 360. 
106. Jessica O’Reilly, Tectonic History and Gondwanan Geopolitics in the Larsemann Hills,
Antarctica, 34 POL’Y & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 214, 217 (2011).  
107.  Part of the problem arises from the fact that epistemic communities are meant to provide
expert technical advice to international policymakers, and very little hard data exists regarding the
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homogeneity in values, perspectives, and sense of mission, the less 
conflict of interest there will be and the easier it will be for organizations 
to reach and sustain agreements on appropriate actions.”108 
The longstanding, politically powerful, and highly cohesive nature 
of the international arbitration community suggests that it will be able to 
wield more influence in the UNCITRAL negotiations than the 
international mediation community. This is particularly due to the 
relatively high degree of access that arbitral elites have historically had 
in the international policymaking process at UNCITRAL.109 However, 
the persuasiveness of any epistemic community often depends on 
whether and to what extent the underlying beliefs of that community 
demonstrate a need for international policy coordination.110 Recently 
generated empirical research suggests the international legal community 
(broadly defined) perceives a significant need for a new treaty on the 
international enforcement of mediated settlement agreements,111 which 
may bode well for the mediation community’s ability to overcome some 
of the arbitral community’s concerns about the proposed convention. If 
the mediation community can provide experts in arbitration with a 
sufficiently compelling account of the need for and benefits of a new 
treaty in this area of law, the two groups’ combined opinion will be 
difficult for state actors to resist.112 
use, perception, or form of international commercial mediation. See Haas, supra note 15, at 4; 
Strong, Empirical, supra note 35. Although the UNCITRAL Secretariat (which can itself be 
considered an epistemic community) has compiled a number of comparative doctrinal studies 
regarding the use of mediation in different jurisdictions, that study addresses a slightly different 
issue. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 53, at 7-9; Working Group II Comparative Study, supra 
note 44. 
108. Sebenius, supra note 9, at 362. 
109. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
110. Haas, supra note 15, at 30. 
111. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35 (discussing results from an international study of
over 220 academics, judges, neutrals, practitioners, and parties involved in international dispute 
resolution).  
112. Although a unity of interests and goals is helpful, it does not always guarantee a
particular outcome in the international arena. For example, experts have suggested that  
[b]inding norms typically emerge when a regime has moved along the continuum from
mere coordination to at least a partial convergence of interests and values. For example,
the processes of international negotiation leading to the conclusion of treaties are “often 
characterized by bargaining and coercive moves rather than by persuasion and by ap-
peals to common standards, shared values, and accepted solutions.” Treaty rules that re-
sult from such trade-offs, where common interests and values have not been present, are
unlikely to act as “causes” of behavior.
Brunee & Toope, supra note 6, at 31 (citations omitted). But see Carlos Fernando Diaz, With Law 
on Their Minds: Some Reflections on the Nature of Public International Law at the Light of Current 
Political Science Theory, 4 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1133, 1143 (1998) (discussing permanent and 
temporary coalitions based on “common values, interests and knowledge”). 
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Negotiation theory suggests that, when framing this discussion, the 
mediation community should focus on advancing proposals that 
maximize areas of convergence between the arbitration and mediation 
communities rather than areas of divergence.113 The following analysis 
therefore seeks to identify the values and interests of the arbitral and 
mediation communities so as to determine whether and to what extent 
any commonalities exist.114 
In the course of this inquiry, the term “value” will be used to refer 
to the relevant community’s view about how international commercial 
disputes should be resolved, while the term “interest” will be used to 
refer to the relevant community’s views about whether and how to foster 
use of a particular process (in this case, international commercial 
mediation and conciliation).115 Thus, in this context, values are intrinsic 
113. There is a considerable amount of literature on negotiation theory, although much of it
arises in the context of interpersonal relationships rather than intergroup or international relations. 
But see Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves, 33 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 503, 510 (2008) (noting some scholars’ attempts to “transpose theories of private 
bargaining into a social theory of problem solving” (citation and emphasis omitted)); see also id. at 
505 (noting “negotiation literature presents . . . a well-developed body of ideas about the 
microworkings of individual and group bargainers who are always imagined to be in interdependent 
yet voluntary relations with fellow bargainers”). However, negotiation theory has been applied in 
the interstate context. See Christian Downie, Toward an Understanding of State Behavior in 
Prolonged International Negotiations, 17 INT’L NEGOT. 295, 299 (2012) [hereinafter Downie, 
Prolonged Negotiations] (noting most theorists focus on one-off negotiations and noting the ways in 
which long-term negotiations evolve); Anna Spain, Using International Dispute Resolution to 
Address the Compliance Question in International Law, 40 GEO. J. INT’L L. 807, 820-22 (2009) 
[hereinafter Spain, International Dispute Resolution]. 
114. This methodology is consistent with “interest-based” (i.e., integrative) negotiation. See 
Sebenius, supra note 9, at 360. Experts have noted that 
[a]n interest-based approach—sometimes called a “problem-solving” approach—
involves identification and selection of options maximizing the interests of all the par-
ties. People begin by identifying interests and developing options for mutual gain and
then select the best option. contrasts with a traditional, positional—or adversarial—
approach, in which each side sets extreme aspiration levels and makes a series of strate-
gic offers and counter-offers intended to result in a resolution as close as possible to that
side’s initial aspiration. Typically, each side makes small concessions to maximize its
adversarial advantage. An interest-based approach relies more on reason than threat and
has the potential to “create value” by identifying and satisfying the interests of all the
parties.
John Lande, Principles for Policymaking About Collaborative Law and Other ADR Processes, 22 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 619, 628 n.29 (2007) (citing, inter alia, FISHER ET AL., supra note 49, 
at 4-7, 40-84 and Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The 
Structure of Problem-Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 794-829 (1984)). 
115. Although negotiation theorists recognize that parties can and often should negotiate with
an eye on both values and interests, there does not seem to be a universal definition of the terms. See 
CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR RESOLVING 
CONFLICTS 64-65 (2003) (discussing types of conflicts).  
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in nature while interests reflect more of an instrumental character.116 The 
distinction is important because value conflicts are typically more 
difficult to resolve than interest conflicts in situations involving “regime 
formation.”117 
A. Core Values and Interests of the International Commercial
Arbitration Community
The maturity of international commercial arbitration makes it
relatively easy to determine the values and interests of this particular 
group.118 The primary interest of the international arbitration community 
is clear: the continued predominance of international commercial and 
investment arbitration as the preferred means of resolving cross-border 
business disputes.119 Although cynics may perceive this interest as 
purely personal (claiming, for example, that expert arbitrators and 
practitioners promote arbitration so as to increase the demand for their 
skills and thus maximize their own personal gain), many members of the 
community also support international arbitration as a matter of principle. 
Indeed, a number of highly regarded specialists in international 
commercial arbitration have taken the view that arbitration is the best 
practical method of resolving cross-border business disputes, and that 
international commercial arbitration promotes world peace, a view that 
is consistent with the espoused purpose and principles of 
UNCITRAL.120 
Although this type of principled approach is consistent with the 
notion of an epistemic community, the intensity and nature of this 
particular attitude may make it difficult for these sorts of “true believers” 
to accept the possibility that mediation may be a better means of 
resolving some types of disputes.121 Indeed, persons who have adopted 
116. See DAVID S. HAMES, CLOSING DEALS, SETTLING DISPUTES, AND MAKING TEAM 
DECISIONS 91 (2012) (distinguishing intrinsic and instrumental goals in negotiation theory and 
practice).  
117. Young, supra note 6, at 10 (noting differences between spontaneous regime formation,
imposed regime formation and negotiated regime formation); see also MOORE, supra note 115, at 
64-65 (discussing types of conflicts).  
118. See S.I. Strong, Arbitration of International Business Disputes – Studies in Law and
Practice, by William W. Park, 29 ARB. INT’L 671, 672-74 (2013) (book review). 
119. See BORN, supra note 31, at 73. 
120. See G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6594, at
pmbl (Dec. 17, 1966); UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 53, at Annex I; Jennifer Kirby, What is an 
Award, Anyway?, 31 J. INT’L ARB. 475, 475 (2014) (noting that one highly renowned international 
arbitration practitioner was firmly of the belief that international commercial arbitration was “the 
key to world peace”); see also supra note 53. 
121. The debate about whether and to what extent mediation is appropriate in cases involving
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this perspective may actively oppose the adoption of a new convention 
relating to international commercial mediation based on a belief that 
such an instrument is either unnecessary (because of arbitration’s 
dominant status in the area of international dispute resolution) or 
inefficient (because arbitration is the superior method of dispute 
resolution and measures that increase the use of mediation simply 
increase the cost and duration of the dispute resolution process as a 
whole).122 
However, this is not the only way for arbitration specialists to frame 
their interests. Instead, experts in international commercial arbitration 
could view the issue more broadly and characterize their interests as 
being consistent with those of their clients. Thus, if clients prefer to 
mediate some or all of their disputes,123 any measure that facilitates 
international commercial mediation, including the proposed UNCITRAL 
convention, can be seen as a good and necessary measure.124 
At this point, it is unclear what it will take to convince parties or 
practitioners of the benefits of mediation in the international commercial 
or investment setting.125 However, recent empirical studies have shown 
that numerous experts in international dispute resolution believe that a 
treaty on international commercial mediation that operates in a manner 
similar to that of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) would 
be very useful in increasing the attractiveness and use of mediation in 
the cross-border business context.126 This type of empirical support may 
cross-border business disputes is ongoing. See Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 16-24. However, most 
experts in mediation agree that mediation is not appropriate for all types of disputes. See John Lande 
& Rachel Wohl, Listening to Experienced Users, 13 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 18, 19 (2007); Frank E.A. 
Sander & Lukasz Rozdieczer, Matching Cases and Dispute Resolution Procedures: Detailed 
Analysis Leading to A Mediation-Centered Approach, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2006).  
122. See Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 31-32 (discussing how a convention would help put
international commercial arbitration and international commercial mediation on a more even 
footing). 
123. Mediation specialists have identified a number of benefits associated with mediation as a
general proposition, although it is unclear whether and to what extent those benefits apply in cross-
border commercial cases. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35. 
124. See Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 31-32 (discussing perceived need for convention to
promote international commercial mediation). 
125. Empirical evidence suggests that the major reason why parties and practitioners do not
recommend mediation in cross-border business disputes is a lack of evidence about the benefits of 
the process. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35, at 36. 
126. See New York Convention, supra note 45; Strong, Empirical, supra note 35 (discussing
data regarding the content of future conventions in this field). The New York Convention is widely 
considered the most successful commercial treaty in the world and provides for the recognition and 
enforcement of arbitration agreements and awards.  See New York Convention, supra note 45; 
BORN, supra note 31, at 78, 99. 
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be very useful in convincing the arbitral community of the need for 
mediation in a properly designed international dispute resolution 
system.127 
The international arbitration community’s values can also be 
described in both broad and narrow terms. For example, if the question 
is considered from a distributive perspective (i.e., as a zero-sum 
proposition that pits arbitration against mediation), any increase in the 
use of mediation must necessarily result in an equal decrease in the use 
of arbitration.128 If the debate is framed in these terms, the arbitral 
community will of course choose to promote arbitration over mediation 
and will consequently oppose the proposed convention. This type of 
blocking behavior could have a significant effect on deliberations at 
UNCITRAL, given the influence of the arbitral community in 
UNCITRAL and Working Group II.129 
At one time, distributive analyses were considered the primary, if 
not exclusive, means of analyzing interstate negotiations.130 However, 
contemporary theorists have come to recognize the value of integrative 
methodologies wherein parties seek to “create” value rather than simply 
“claim” value.131 Framing the UNCITRAL process in integrative (i.e., 
win-win) terms would require negotiators to consider whether various 
values could be redefined in a way that would promote various areas of 
commonality. 
That process would require parties to move past superficial 
analyses and focus on the core values of international commercial 
arbitration, which are typically considered to include privacy, 
confidentiality, finality, and an impartial and independent third-party 
neutral.132 International arbitration also respects procedural fairness and 
127. See Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Reflections on Designing Governance to Produce the Rule
of Law, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 67, 74 (“A conflict, issue, dispute, or case submitted to any institution 
for managing conflict (including one labeled ADR) exists in the context of a system of rules, 
processes, steps, and forums. In the field of ADR, this is called dispute systems design (DSD).”). It 
is possible, if not critically important, to consider dispute system design on an international scale. 
See Anna Spain, Integration Matters: Rethinking the Architecture of International Dispute 
Resolution, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 46-47 (2010) [hereinafter Spain, Integration]. 
128. See Sebenius, supra note 9, at 335 (discussing the difference between “claiming value” 
(as in win-lose or distributive scenarios) and “creating value” (as in win-win or integrative 
scenarios)). 
129. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
130. See William F. Coyne, Jr., The Case for Settlement Counsel, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 367, 375 (1999) (citing survey indicating that positional (i.e., distributive) bargaining was 
used entirely or primarily in seventy-one percent of cases).  
131. See id. (noting that lawyers wanted to use interest-based negotiation more); Sebenius,
supra note 9, at 360. 
132. See BORN, supra note 31, at 73-97; Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 21, at 36-38; 
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party autonomy as well as the ability to combine common law and civil 
law procedures, avoid the parochialism of national courts, and obtain an 
easy, predictable, and relatively inexpensive means of enforcing arbitral 
awards across borders.133 At one time, international arbitration was 
considered a faster and less expensive alternative to international 
litigation, although these attributes have recently been questioned as a 
result of the increasing legalism in the field.134 
Interestingly, almost all of these values can be met in mediation to 
virtually the same extent as in arbitration. Mediation is a private and 
confidential process featuring an impartial, third party-neutral who 
upholds procedural fairness and party autonomy and who assists the 
parties in resolving international commercial and investment disputes 
efficiently and cost-effectively without the need to involve the judicial 
system.135 These shared attributes exist even though mediation is a 
consensual mechanism rather than an adjudicative one.136 The only 
values that are not currently met in mediation are (1) the desire to obtain 
a final and binding award, since mediation is considered non-binding 
unless and until the parties sign a settlement agreement, and (2) the 
ability to achieve easy, predictable, and relatively inexpensive 
enforcement of the result of the process (an award in arbitration and a 
settlement agreement in mediation, if the parties decide to resolve the 
dispute) across national borders.137 However, the proposed UNCITRAL 
convention promotes both of these two values by establishing an 
efficient and cost-effective means of enforcing a settlement agreement 
arising out of international commercial mediation, thereby helping 
QUEEN MARY, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, RESEARCH AT THE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION, http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/research/index.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2014) 
[hereinafter QMUL Studies] (containing details regarding five different empirical studies 
concerning international arbitration); see also EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 13-66 (2010) (discussing theoretical bases of international 
arbitration). 
133. See BORN, supra note 31, at 73-97.
134. See id. at 86-87.
135. See Michael L. Moffitt, Schmediation and the Dimensions of Definition, 10 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 69, 78-83 (2005) (noting problems inherent in defining mediation).  
136. Although arbitration also arises by consent of the parties, the parties are bound to the
procedure and to a final, binding resolution of the matter once they consent to the process, which is 
adjudicative in nature. Mediation, on the other hand, is considered consensual not only because the 
parties must express their consent to enter into the mediation process but because resolution of the 
dispute only occurs if the parties agree (i.e., consent) to a particular settlement agreement. 
Mediators do not impose a particular outcome on the parties, as is the case in arbitration. 
137. See Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 31-32 (noting lack of enforcement mechanism in
international commercial mediation); Strong, Empirical, supra note 35, at 47 (noting difficulty in 
international enforcement of mediated settlements). 
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parties achieve final and binding resolution of their dispute.138 
If the issue is framed in this manner, the international arbitration 
community not only can but also should support the proposed 
convention as a means of furthering the core values of their epistemic 
community. While some individuals may continue to oppose the 
proposed convention based on personal financial concerns, membership 
in an epistemic community requires the adoption of certain “shared 
normative commitments” not as a result of external motivations (which 
would include financial self-interest) but instead as a result of a 
“principled approach to the issue at hand.”139 As a result, the most 
influential voices in the arbitral community will likely focus on and 
promote these core, universal values rather than personal 
considerations.140 
B. Core Values and Interests of the (International Commercial)
Mediation Community
The relatively recent rise of international commercial mediation as
a field of practice and inquiry can make it somewhat difficult to identify 
the community’s core values and interests.141 Indeed, discussions at 
UNCITRAL have raised fears that a community of experts in 
international commercial mediation may not yet exist, since a number of 
participants in the process have been drawn from the domestic sphere 
138. See U.S. Proposal, supra note 1. At this point, it is very difficult to enforce a mediated
settlement agreement across national borders. See id.; Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 31-32 (noting 
difficult of enforcement of agreements in international commercial mediation). 
139. Haas, supra note 15, at 19; see also Sebenius, supra note 9, at 325 (claiming that “an 
epistemic community can be understood as a special kind of de facto natural coalition of ‘believers’ 
whose main interest lies not in the material sphere but instead in fostering the adoption of the 
community’s policy project”); id. at 353 (distinguishing material interests from policy goals). 
140. See Bianchi, supra note 8, at 17-18 (noting a “plurality of visions quite obviously entails
a struggle between different social groups that attempt to impose their own view as the most 
authoritative and legitimate one. To determine who is entitled to speak authoritatively about 
international law is certainly a stake that most members of the different epistemic communities at 
play in international law would consider as worth fighting for”); Haas, supra note 15, at 17-18; 
Sebenius, supra note 9, at 325. Every epistemic community considers certain beliefs and practices 
as reflective of the received or conventional wisdom that distinguishes core members of the 
community from those on the fringe. See Haas, supra note 15, at 17-18 (noting that membership and 
influence in an epistemic community are determined not only by a person’s “professional pedigree” 
but also by reference to various “validity tests”). 
141. See supra notes 34-46 and accompanying text. Commentators have disputed whether a
singular theory of mediation exists even within the United States. See Dorothy J. Della Noce et al., 
Clarifying the Theoretical Underpinnings of Mediation: Implications for Practice and Policy, 3 
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 39, 40-41 (2002). 
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rather than the international realm.142 This phenomenon is potentially 
problematic given the often significant differences between international 
and domestic disputes.143 
The situation is further exacerbated by the fact that the domestic 
mediation community includes a number of practitioners and neutrals 
who work frequently in fields other than commercial law.144 Thus, 
during the early days of the development of the U.S. proposal, some 
observers suggested that the proposed convention should incorporate 
various mechanisms (such as a “cooling off” period between the time of 
the settlement agreement and the signing of a binding document) that 
might be useful in certain types of domestic disputes but that are neither 
necessary nor appropriate in the international commercial context.145 
This is not to say that it is impossible to identify the values and 
interests of the international commercial mediation community. For 
example, it may be possible to extrapolate some observations from the 
domestic realm and apply them to cross-border matters, although that 
approach must be used with caution.146 Some assistance may also be 
gleaned from a number of recent empirical studies on the use and 
perception of international commercial mediation and conciliation.147 
Together, these resources provide some insights that may prove useful to 
the UNCITRAL deliberations. 
In many ways, the interests of the mediation community can be said 
to mirror those of the arbitration community, in that experts in mediation 
would like to see their preferred procedure—mediation—established as 
the prevalent means of resolving cross-border business disputes, thereby 
returning mediation and conciliation to the prominence they enjoyed 
142. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35. 
143. See Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 16-24. 
144. Thus, for example, family law mediators face very different dilemmas and use somewhat
different procedures than commercial mediators. See John Bickerman, We Have Met the Enemy . . . 
And He May Be Us, 13 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 2, 2 (2007).  
145. See Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected 
Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 90-92 (2001). 
Although cooling off periods may be appropriate in family or consumer mediation, where there is a 
significant power imbalance, such mechanisms are not usually necessary in international 
commercial of investment matters, where the parties are represented by experienced counsel and 
operate at arm’s length, particularly since mandatory cooling off periods could have significant 
financial ramifications in situations where interest on loans or defaults accrues daily. See Mark 
Kantor, Negotiated Settlement of Public Infrastructure Disputes, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: IN MEMORIAM THOMAS WÄLDE 199, 214 (Todd Weiler & Freya 
Baetens eds., 2011) (noting the cost of mandatory “cooling off” or negotiation periods can be 
astronomical). 
146. See Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 16-24. 
147. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35; IMI SURVEY, supra note 99. 
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prior to World War II.148 While cynics might claim that this position is 
based on self-interest, since an increase in a procedure would lead to an 
increase in revenue for mediation experts, that allegation appears 
inaccurate in the face of the mediation community’s strongly held belief 
in the superiority of mediation over other types of dispute resolution.149 
Furthermore, the incidence of international commercial mediation is at 
this point so small that it would appear unlikely that participants in the 
UNCITRAL process would support the proposed convention simply as a 
means of increasing their own personal income.150 
Although the mediation community could frame its interests as only 
involving the promotion of mediation per se, it is also possible to 
characterize the community’s interests as paralleling those of their 
clients. Since an increasing number of commercial actors have indicated 
that they would like to pursue mediation and conciliation of their cross-
border business and investment disputes,151 the international mediation 
community can also promote mediation as a means of fulfilling their 
client’s interests. 
These two analyses mirror those used to determine the interests of 
the international arbitration community. However, early discussions 
regarding the proposed UNCITRAL process brought another potential 
interest to light: the mediation community’s interest in having the 
proposed convention reflect the “right” or “best” procedure. This interest 
was evident in comments from a number of mediation specialists that the 
relatively undeveloped nature of international commercial mediation 
meant that it was too soon to consider an international convention of the 
type proposed by the United States.152 However, this position was in 
many ways factually and legally unfounded. For example, there are 
already numerous types of international instruments relating to 
international commercial mediation and conciliation, which suggests a 
certain degree of legal sophistication even if parties have not yet availed 
148. See Schwartz, supra note 45, at 99, 107. 
149. See Hensler, supra note 34, at 83 (noting near-universal belief among mediation experts
that mediation is the best means of resolving disputes). This belief persists despite the absence (thus 
far) of any hard empirical evidence of the benefits of mediation in the international commercial 
context. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35. 
150. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35, at 26 (noting that only nine percent of respondents
had participated in more than twenty international commercial mediations in the preceding three 
years). 
151. See Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 11. 
152. The underlying concern was that the “wrong” process might be embedded into law,
thereby freezing the development of international commercial mediation and injuring the field as a 
whole. Other participants expressed worries about imposing increased formalism on a process that 
they viewed as intended to be relatively informal. 
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themselves of the existing procedures.153 Furthermore, the adoption of a 
convention on enforcement of mediated settlements does not require 
consensus on the shape of the proceedings themselves, just as the New 
York Convention does not require consensus on the shape of arbitral 
proceedings.154 Thus, issues involving the need to foster the “right” type 
of mediation do not appear to be a sufficiently compelling reason to 
block the proposed convention and can thus be set aside.155 
Interest identification is not the only task that must be completed. It 
is also necessary to determine the values of the international commercial 
mediation community. Unfortunately, several potential difficulties arise 
in this regard. 
The first issue involves problems associated with defining the 
difference between mediation and conciliation.156 Although UNCITRAL 
has previously defined these two terms as being synonymous,157 
participants in the UNCITRAL process have suggested that a more 
precise definition will be necessary in any future instrument in this 
area.158 It is unclear at this point whether that claim has been raised as an 
obstructionist tactic or whether the concerns are legitimate, particularly 
153. For example, UNCITRAL has enacted a model law concerning international commercial
mediation and conciliation as well as procedural rules. See United Nations General Assembly, 
Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law, G.A. Res. 57/18, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/57/18, (Jan. 
24, 2003); United Nations General Assembly, Conciliation Rules of the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., 81st plen. mtg. at 260, U.N. Doc. 
A/35/52 (Dec. 4, 1980). Numerous private institutions have also adopted procedural rules relating to 
international commercial mediation. See John M. Barkett, Avoiding the Costs of International 
Commercial Arbitration: Is Mediation the Solution?, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2010, 359, 365-82 (Arthur W. Rovine ed., 
2010). 
154. See New York Convention, supra note 45. However, the proposed convention may 
equalize some of the existing legal disparities between international commercial mediation and 
international commercial arbitration (namely, those relating to enforcement of the outcome) and 
could thereby drive parties toward mediation in the same way that the New York Convention drove 
parties toward arbitration in the post-World War II era. See id.; Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 13-14, 
31-32. 
155. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (regarding core and fringe beliefs).
156. The academic debate about this issue has been quite heated at times. See Nolan-Haley,
Primrose Path, supra note 36, at 1009-10; Spain, Integration, supra note 127, at 10-11; Nancy A. 
Welsh & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation Into Bilateral 
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 71, 84-85 (2013).  
157. See WG Report, supra note 2, para. 13 n.11; UNCITRAL MODEL LAW GUIDE, supra 
note 2, at 11; U.S. Proposal, supra note 1, at 9 (suggesting that any future instrument adopted by 
UNCITRAL in this field would likely need to include a definition of “conciliation”). 
158. See U.S. Proposal, supra note 1, at 4; United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law, Report of Working Group II (Arbitration and Conciliation) on the work of its sixty-third 
session (New York, 27 June-15 July, 2015), paras. 20-23, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/861 (Sept. 17, 2015). 
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given that arbitration has long experienced similar definitional problems 
without anyone claiming that the New York Convention is thereby 
invalidated.159 
At this point, the major difference between mediation and 
conciliation appears to be that conciliation requires an evaluative 
element, whereas mediation merely permits a certain amount of 
evaluation by the neutral.160 Beyond that, the two processes appear to 
reflect relatively similar values. As a result, this issue can be set aside. 
A second concern arises as a result of the relative lack of theoretical 
and empirical research into the special nature of international 
commercial mediation and conciliation.161 Although a significant 
amount of information exists regarding the values of domestic 
mediation, it is unclear whether and to what extent those principles can 
be extended to the international commercial realm.162 Nevertheless, a 
heuristic analysis informed by the available data would suggest some 
preliminary conclusions. 
First, empirical research shows that actual and potential participants 
in international commercial mediation value the process to the extent it 
saves them time and money, a goal that is consistent with that of the 
arbitral community.163 Furthermore, survey data indicates that 
commercial parties value the saving of time and money even over the 
preservation of existing relationships, which is one of the benefits that 
has long been theoretically linked to mediation.164 However, if parties do 
not really value mediation’s ability to maintain commercial 
relationships, then the mediation community cannot be said to value that 
attribute either, at least in a paradigm that ties the community’s interests 
to client interests. 
159. See S.I. Strong, Does Class Arbitration “Change the Nature” of Arbitration? Stolt-
Nielsen, AT&T and a Return to First Principles, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 201, 242-43 (2012) 
(discussing the problems inherent in defining arbitration).  
160. See Nolan-Haley, Primrose Path, supra note 36, at 1009-10.
161. See Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 16-24; see also supra note 99 (discussing additional
empirical work in this field). 
162. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35; Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 16-24. For example,
theorists have suggested that settlement is not considered a core interest of mediation. See Creo, 
supra note 21, at 1032. However, empirical studies have suggested that parties to cross-border 
business disputes are very interested in the efficacy of the procedure. See Strong, Empirical, supra 
note 35. 
163. See also supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text. 
164. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35. During the course of the UNCITRAL deliberations, 
at least one experienced neutral noted that most of her international commercial mediations 
involved the break-up of commercial dealings and that the parties therefore had no need to preserve 
ongoing relationships. 
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Theoretical analyses have suggested a number of other potential 
values. For example, a number of experts have suggested that mediation 
reflects an interest in “connection, voice, and choice” as well as 
“recognition, empowerment, validation, acknowledgment, apology, 
opportunity to be heard, facilitated dialogue, engagement with a non-
partisan mediator, balance, absence of formal procedures, exploration of 
risk and consequences, and creation of alternative solutions outside those 
available within the judicial system.”165 However, empirical research 
suggests that these issues are nowhere near as important to international 
commercial actors as the saving of time and money.166 
Assuming that mediation is indeed a time- and cost-effective means 
of resolving international commercial disputes,167 then adopting a 
convention facilitating the fast and easy enforcement of settlement 
agreements arising out of mediation would appear to further that 
interest.168 Evidence suggests that existing methods of enforcing 
settlement agreements across national borders are both timely and 
expensive,169 which may be one of the reasons why international 
commercial mediation lost ground to international commercial 
arbitration in the post-World War II era.170 As a result, the proposed 
convention would appear to meet the interests of the international 
mediation community, which subsequently suggests that the mediation 
community should therefore support the ongoing UNCITRAL process. 
While some debate may arise as to what particular processes fall within 
the scope of the convention and what measures should be used to 
165. Creo, supra note 21, at 1032. 
166. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35 (noting low ratings of a number of purported
interests in mediation in the international commercial context).  
167. No widespread empirical data is yet available on this point. See id. However, anecdotal
evidence and case studies have identified some costs savings in the international commercial realm. 
See Walter G. Gans & David Stryker, ADR: The Siemens’ Experience, 51 DISP. RESOL. J. 40, 41 
(Apr.-Sept. 1996); Michael A. Wheeler & Gillian Morris, GE’s Early Dispute Resolution Initiative 
(A), HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL 2-4 (June 19, 2001) (discussing General Electric’s domestic 
dispute resolution strategy, based on the Six Sigma approach); Michael A. Wheeler & Gillian 
Morris, GE’s Early Dispute Resolution Initiative (B), HARVARD BUSINESS SCHOOL SUPPLEMENT
801-453 (June 2001) (discussing the internationalization of General Electric’s dispute resolution
strategy); F. Peter Phillips, Speeches Spreading the Word on Business ADR: Assessing Recent
Efforts . . . And Looking Forward, 25 ALT. HIGH COST LITIG. 3, 9 (2007) (discussing corporate
“poster boys” for commercial mediation).
168. See Boule, supra note 5, at 65; Li, supra note 5, at 13; Lo, supra note 5, at 135; Strong,
ICM, supra note 1, at 31-32; Wolski, supra note 5, at 110.  
169. See U.S. Proposal, supra note 1, at 4; Edna Sussman, The New York Convention Through
a Mediation Prism, 14 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 10, 10-13 (2009). 
170. See Schwartz, supra note 45, at 99, 107; Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 13-14. 
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provide effective and fair enforcement across national borders,171 the 
propriety of the end goal appears clear. 
V. CONCLUSION
As the preceding analysis shows, the international legal community 
has become increasingly diversified in the last few years so as to reflect 
and respond to the demands of an ever-more globalized world. The 
international arbitration community has been particularly successful in 
asserting its presence on the international stage and is now a 
sophisticated and powerful influence in international policymaking 
circles. However, the success of the arbitral regime has not insulated the 
process from a number of criticisms.172 Indeed, the field of international 
commercial and investment arbitration is currently facing a number of 
challenges, including claims that mediation and conciliation can be used 
to overcome many of the perceived ills of international arbitration.173 
This Article has not focused on the substance of the debate 
regarding the relative merits of arbitration and mediation in international 
commercial and investment matters, although there is a great deal to 
consider in that regard. Instead, the discussion here has focused on how 
the clash of epistemic cultures is playing out in the international 
lawmaking process, particularly with respect to the U.S. proposal for a 
new UNCITRAL convention on international commercial mediation.174 
Many members of the arbitral community see the U.S. proposal as 
an existential threat to the hegemony of international commercial and 
investment arbitration. Indeed, the deliberations at UNCITRAL have not 
only underscored the severity and significance of mediation’s challenge 
to arbitration as the preferred means of resolving cross-border business 
and investment disputes, they have also highlighted the schism between 
the arbitration and mediation communities. However, debate does not 
need to be divisive to be fruitful. Instead, it is possible for the 
UNCITRAL process to bring the two groups together, not necessarily to 
(re)unify the fields of international commercial arbitration and mediation 
into a single epistemic community but to demonstrate the many 
commonalities between the two factions. 
One of the most valuable functions of an epistemic community is 
171. That issue is very much up for debate in UNCITRAL, although it is beyond the scope of
the current Article. See Secretariat 2016 Note, supra note 4. 
172. See PARK, supra note 79, at 3-27; Rivkin, supra note 14; Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at
11. 
173. See Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 11. 
174. See U.S. Proposal, supra note 1. 
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its ability to educate international policymakers about various interests, 
goals, and procedures so as to promote the development of an 
international policy that satisfies the needs of all participants in both the 
short and long terms.175 Though helpful, this attribute can be problematic 
if an expert group relies on hard bargaining techniques to push through 
an agenda that is largely if not entirely self-aggrandizing. In these 
situations, the coalition with greater political power or influence in the 
interstate lawmaking process—in this case, the international arbitration 
community—might attempt to block reform efforts (such as the new 
convention on international commercial mediation) that are seen as 
harmful to the status quo. This type of tactic might be particularly 
attractive to persons who frame negotiations as a zero-sum analysis, as is 
typically the case of those who routinely engage in adjudicative 
processes such as arbitration.176 
However, negotiation theory has shown that distributive models are 
not the only option available to parties at UNCITRAL. Instead, state 
delegates can, with the assistance of various epistemic communities, 
frame various issues in integrative terms and thereby seek to develop an 
international instrument that maximizes benefits to all participants rather 
than advantaging one group to the detriment of the other. Indeed, 
UNCITRAL, as a consensus-based organization, tends to support this 
type of approach.177 As a result, it may be in the best interests of both the 
arbitration and the mediation communities to find a mutually agreeable 
solution to the crisis in international commercial dispute resolution 
rather than adopt a zero-sum, distributive perspective. 
This approach may not be as difficult as it initially appears, since 
this Article has shown that the arbitration and mediation communities 
share a great deal of common ground, ranging from the desire to fulfill 
their clients’ desires to the wish to promote certain core values such as 
privacy, confidentiality, finality, procedural fairness, party autonomy, 
and use of an impartial and independent third-party neutral to obtain an 
easy, predictable, and relatively inexpensive means of resolving disputes 
175. See Downie, Prolonged Negotiations, supra note 113, at 302-04; Sebenius, supra note 9,
at 327, 329. Epistemic communities can be useful not only in helping to finalize the terms of an 
international agreement but in ensuring widespread adoption and adherence after the instrument has 
been adopted. See id. at 354. 
176. See Jack Coe, Planning for International Disputes (And What Makes Them Distinctive), 5 
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 385, 393 (2005). 
177. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 53, at 6; see also Adler & Haas, supra note 51, at
371 (defining “the role played by epistemic communities as one of policy coordination,” which is 
subsequently defined as “consent and mutual expectation”); supra note 57. 
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across national borders.178 Even more importantly, both communities 
support the quick and inexpensive resolution of international commercial 
and investment disputes.179 These shared beliefs and practices are quite 
significant and suggest that the two expert groups can find common 
ground if they are willing to move past the debate about whether 
adjudicative or consensus-based techniques are preferred or preferable in 
international commercial and investment disputes as an abstract concern. 
In many ways, the debate about the relative merits of arbitration 
and mediation reflect a value conflict that is inherently difficult, if not 
impossible, to resolve.180 While empirical research may eventually shed 
light on this issue, there is currently no hard evidence supporting a 
conclusion that one dispute resolution technique is inherently better than 
the other, at least at a conceptual level.181 Furthermore, the lack of 
equality in the surrounding legal environments suggests that any 
comparison between international arbitration and international mediation 
that is based on current usage levels is inapt.182 As a result, it appears 
best to conclude that, all things being equal, parties will prefer 
arbitration in some circumstances and mediation in others, which 
supports the development of an international instrument that puts the two 
procedures on equal footing so that parties can choose the appropriate 
dispute resolution technique free of any negative externalities.183 This 
sort of incompletely theorized agreement or modus vivendi would appear 
sufficient in the current context.184 
The combination of international relations theory and negotiation 
theory also offers another interesting proposition for participants in the 
current UNCITRAL process. Scholars have suggested that epistemic 
communities typically assert only an indirect influence on the 
development of international policy, in that experts advise state 
representatives who then negotiate with other state actors.185 As this 
Article has shown, that approach seems to be in operation in the current 
deliberations at UNCITRAL.186 However, negotiation theory places a 
178. See BORN, supra note 31, at 73-97. 
179. See id.; Strong, Empirical, supra note 35, at 49. 
180. See MOORE, supra note 115, at 64-65; Young, supra note 6, at 10. 
181. See Strong, Empirical, supra note 35. 
182. See Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 13-14.
183. See Lande & Wohl, supra note 121, at 19; Sander & Rozdieczer, supra note 121, at 1-2; 
Strong, ICM, supra note 1, at 13-14, 31-32. 
184. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 
1739, 1746-51 (1995). 
185. See supra notes 65-67, 96 and accompanying text. 
186. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
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high value on direct communication between the actual parties in 
conflict,187 which suggests that the mediation community could make 
significant inroads in the ongoing effort to promote the proposed 
convention by engaging directly with the arbitral community, since the 
two groups are in many ways the source of the current conflict. Indeed, 
specialists in mediation are particularly well-placed to engage in these 
types of discussions, given their technical expertise in interest-based 
negotiation. If the mediation community can convince the arbitral 
community of the benefits of the proposed treaty and the range of shared 
interests in promoting a new international instrument in this field, the 
arbitral community can then join (rather than oppose) efforts to convince 
state delegates of the need to adopt a new convention on this subject.188 
Such a combined effort would likely have a strong influence on 
various state delegates and thus could improve the chances that the 
proposed initiative will succeed. However, different state delegates may 
interpret and apply expert advice in different ways,189 which means that 
a united arbitration-mediation initiative does not guarantee a particular 
outcome. Furthermore, this analysis has not taken into account the 
possible influence of other coalitional forces. For example, the current 
deliberations are experiencing a significant amount of resistance from 
several states and geographic regions on grounds unrelated to the 
distinctions between arbitration and mediation. Interestingly, a number 
of the arguments appear to arise out of differences between the civil law 
and common law. For example, some civil law countries have expressed 
concerns that settlement agreements should be considered akin to any 
other type of contract and should therefore not be considered in 
connection with various rules of civil procedure. Conversely, many if 
not most common law jurisdictions view mediation as a dispute 
resolution mechanism that is on the same conceptual level as both 
litigation and arbitration and therefore consider mediated settlements to 
be in many ways analogous to arbitral awards and judicial decisions. 
These disparities may be the result of various differences in common 
187. See Spain, International Dispute Resolution, supra note 113, at 825-26. 
188. See U.S. Proposal, supra note 1; Downie, Prolonged Negotiations, supra note 113, at
312. Interestingly, various members of the mediation community attempted to engage in direct
communications with state delegates at the February 2016 meeting of Working Group II through a
meeting meant to educate state delegates about mediation. See Hal Abramson & Janet Martinez,
Workshop on Conciliation Process (Feb. 2016) (featuring a lunchtime program at Working Group II 
organized by IMI). However, such efforts could backfire if the arbitral community views such
tactics as illegitimate.
189. See Haas, supra note 15, at 30. 
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law and civil law reasoning,190 or may reflect certain theoretical 
differences on how to frame private forms of dispute resolution.191 
While these issues are beyond the scope of the current Article, they bear 
further analysis in the future. 
Another influence to consider involves groups of repeat or cross-
cutting international players. A number of NGO and state delegates are 
involved in negotiations at several public and private international 
institutions, including UNCITRAL, the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, and the International Institute for the Unification of 
Private Law (UNIDOIT). These individuals are not only engaged in 
projects that involve several different organizations, they are also active 
in a variety of areas of substantive and procedural law.192 Their 
knowledge, expertise, and influence extends across a wide range of 
projects, thereby adding another level of complexity to analyses 
regarding interstate negotiations. While these issues are also beyond the 
scope of the current Article, it would be interesting to study whether 
these individuals can be considered to have created an epistemic 
community of their own and whether these types of repeat players affect 
international policymaking in a unique and discernable manner. 
The analysis in this Article has focused primarily on matters 
relating to the proposed UNCITRAL convention on international 
commercial mediation and is therefore of significant importance to 
members of the international dispute resolution community. However, 
the discussion regarding the interplay between international relations and 
190. See S.I. Strong, Reasoned Awards in International Commercial Arbitration: Embracing 
and Exceeding the Common Law-Civil Law Dichotomy, 37 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 36-39 (2015). 
191. See JULIAN D.M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 71-82 (2003) (discussing the juridical nature of international arbitration and 
distinguishing between four different theories, incluidng the jurisdictional theory, the contractual 
theory, the mixed theory (sometimes called the hybrid theory) and the autonomous theory). 
 192.  See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
https://www.hcch.net/en/home (last visited Feb. 21, 2017) (listing projects in family law (including 
child abduction, adoption, maintenance, and protection of adults and children); civil procedure 
(including access to justice, apostilles, choice of courts, evidence, form of wills and service of 
process); and substantive law (including choice of law in contracts, securities and trusts), among 
others); UNIDROIT, http://www.unidroit.org/about-unidroit/work-programme (last visted Feb. 21, 
2017) (listing projects involving international commercial contracts, secured transactions, capital 
markets, satellite-based services and farming contracts, among others); WORKING GROUPS, 
UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups.html (last visted Feb. 
21, 2017) (listing working groups in micro-small, and medium-sized enterprises; procurement; 
privately financed infrastructure projects; arbitration and conciliation; international contract 
practices; international sale of goods; transport law; shipping; electronic commerce; electronic data 
interchange; international payments; international negotiable instruments; insolvency; and security 
interests, among others).  
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negotiation theory is also of interest to a wider audience. Not only does 
the analysis reflected herein provide useful insights into the international 
lawmaking process, it also demonstrates the difficulties experienced by 
many newly formed epistemic communities who wish to “expand from a 
typically small and de facto natural coalition into a meaningful winning 
coalition.”193 Epistemic communities may experience additional 
difficulties in the coming years, given the increasing disregard for 
technical expertise in political debate and discourse.194 As a result, 
experts in international law, international relations, and dispute 
resolution can learn much by analyzing the current deliberations at 
UNCITRAL concerning a new international treaty involving 
international commercial mediation and conciliation. 
193. Sebenius, supra note 9, at 364. 
194. See S.I. Strong, Alternative Facts and the Post-Truth Society: Meeting the Challenge, 165 
U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 137, 137 (2017); S.I. Strong, Truth in a Post-Truth Society: How Sticky 
Defaults, Status Quo Bias and the Sovereign Prerogative Influence the Perceived Legitimacy of
International Arbitration, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018). 
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